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THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFER(?):  A 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA’S RULE 11BIS TO PERMIT TRANSFER 
TO RWANDAN DOMESTIC COURTS 
Jesse Melman* 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR or Tribunal) 
Rule of Procedure and Evidence 11bis allows the Tribunal to transfer 
accused persons to domestic courts in order to expedite the hearing of the 
thousands of genocide cases still waiting on the ICTR’s overloaded docket.  
So long as certain baseline requirements are met, Rule 11bis, on its face, 
does not distinguish between domestic Rwandan courts and other 
jurisdictions.  However, despite granting requests for transfer to other 
countries’ courts, the Tribunal has repeatedly denied applications for 
transfer to Rwanda notwithstanding numerous requests.  Further, behind 
such requests lies the pressing need to resolve all outstanding cases before 
the Tribunal’s looming 2013 termination date. 
This Note explores the requirements for a successful transfer to a 
domestic jurisdiction set forth in Rule 11bis and how the Government of 
Rwanda has labored, through legislated judicial reform, to meet those 
requirements.  After analyzing the history and founding principles behind 
the formation of the ICTR, the Note then explores how the Tribunal has 
applied the 11bis requirements for transfer applications to countries other 
than Rwanda and to Rwanda itself, as well as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) application of the Rule.  
Finding an inconsistent application of the Rule between applications for 
transfer outside Rwanda and to Rwanda itself, the Note offers a more 
comprehensive balancing test that the ICTR should consider when 
determining whether to transfer cases to domestic courts.  Finally, this Note 
argues that in weighing countervailing judicial interests expressed in the 
formation of the ICTR against specific due process concerns, the Tribunal 
may, in specific cases, be able to transfer cases to Rwanda, thus 
contributing to the overall interests of justice and the utilitarian goal of 
unloading the Tribunal’s docket. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2008, The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem; B.A., 2005, University of Rochester.  I would like to thank 
Professor Justice Richard Goldstone for his insights, candor, and support.  I would also like 
to thank Ariella for her constant encouragement throughout the writing and editing process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 3, 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR or Tribunal) ruled that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s one-and-one-half 
year detention prior to being charged violated his human rights and 
consequently ordered his release.1  The possible release of a man accused of 
inciting mass genocide through the use of his radio station due to a 
procedural technicality created an uproar in Rwanda, resulting in the 
Rwandan government’s (GOR) severance of diplomatic relations with the 
international court, which were not restored until February 2000.2  While 
the court eventually revised its opinion to deny his release,3 this episode 
illustrates the tension that may arise when an international court is charged 
with adjudicating cases relating to mass atrocities that were carried out 
 
 1. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 106 (Nov. 
3, 1999) [hereinafter Barayagwiza, Decision]; see Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the 
Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan 
National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 
180–81 (2000); Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide:  From Guilt to Shame to Civis 
in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1284 (2000). 
 2. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1284; Carroll, supra note 1, at 180–81. 
 3. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 72 (Mar. 31, 2000) (holding that although the 
defendant’s rights were violated, such violation does not merit dismissal of the charges and 
release). 
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against citizens of a specific sovereign nation.4  This has called into 
question the primary purpose of such international tribunals:  is their 
mission to hold perpetrators of mass atrocity accountable and bring them to 
justice or to serve the sometimes competing goals and interests of the 
international legal community in establishing international legal norms, 
which may involve a strict application of Western due process rights?5 
From a practical perspective, the question was moot at the time of 
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza;6 Rwanda was still in the process of rebuilding 
its judiciary after its total destruction during the 1994 Genocide and was 
having a difficult enough time dealing with its overcrowded prisons and 
broken judicial system.7  However, fifteen years after the genocide, Rwanda 
has made great strides in developing a legal system8 and has adjudicated 
more genocide cases than any other country in the world.9  In fact, the 
ICTR Appeals Chamber has even noted the independence of the Rwandan 
judiciary, pointing out that the courts and government continue to work 
with the Tribunal despite the Tribunal’s acquittal of five defendants.10 
 
 4. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1285; Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts:  
Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
347, 427 (2006). 
 5. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1285; see also Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or 
Complementarity:  Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International 
Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 407–08 (1998) (emphasis omitted) (ad hoc 
tribunals serve to address “fundamental humanitarian interests of concern” as well as 
“threat[s] to international peace and security”); Frederik Harhoff, Consonance or Rivalry?  
Calibrating the Efforts to Prosecute War Crimes in National and International Tribunals, 7 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 571, 584–85 (1997) (“One must always recognize that the 
Tribunal was established not only to restore peace and justice in Rwanda, but also to 
maintain international peace and security as a new institution which could pave the way for 
the prevention of such atrocities in the future on a more general level. . . .  [O]n this point, 
the Tribunal has its own agenda.”). 
 6. Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 106 (Nov. 3, 1999). 
 7. See Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment:  Rwanda’s Restorative Dispute 
Resolution Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 26–28 (2005). 
 8. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-01-67-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 56 (Dec. 16, 2008) 
[hereinafter Kayishema, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision] (“The Chamber concludes that 
Rwanda has made notable progress in improving its judicial system.”); Prosecutor v. Gatete, 
Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the 
Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 95 (Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Gatete, Transfer Decision] (same); 
Erike Møse, The ICTR’s Completion Strategy—Challenges and Possible Solutions, 6 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 667, 674 (2008) (noting that “Rwanda has made progress in reforming its 
judicial system”). 
 9. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1287. 
 10. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 28 (Oct. 8, 2008) 
[hereinafter Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision].  Further underscoring the 
confidence that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has in the Rwandan 
judiciary, the ICTR Prosecutor recently declined to seek the referral of four former Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) members who are currently being tried in Rwandan courts, noting that 
the trial was open and public and that ICTR monitors confirmed that fair trial standards were 
observed. See U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 
2009) [hereinafter Security Council Meeting 6134]. 
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At the same time, the ICTR jointly with its sister, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia (ICTY), has proven to be very 
expensive.11  Together, they account for over ten percent of the United 
Nations’ overall budget, with the ICTR averaging $45.5 million per 
conviction.12  In part because of this enormous expense, the Security 
Council has mandated that the Tribunals begin to conclude their work.13  As 
part of the ICTR’s completion strategy, in compliance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 150314 and 1534,15 the Prosecutor hopes to 
transfer some of its remaining cases to Rwanda for adjudication by the 
national courts.16 
However, the ICTR’s Trial and Appeals Chambers’ strict application of 
Rule 11bis of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence17 has prevented such 
transfers.18  Most recently, the Appeals Chamber denied the transfer of 
Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda on the basis that Rwandan courts do 
not provide sufficient fair trial guarantees as required under Rule 11bis.19  
The ICTR continues to question the sufficiency of Rwandan law and 
practice despite the fact that the Rwandan legislature has continuously 
revised its genocide laws and laws pertaining to ICTR cases, particularly in 
order to accord with ICTR requirements.20  In so doing, and in contrast with 
its application of 11bis to requests for transfer to non-Rwandan venues,21 
the ICTR not only looks to see whether Rwandan domestic law is sufficient 
but also conducts a factual determination of whether such law is applied.22  
As a result, the Tribunal, in the Rwandan context, approaches the 11bis 
analysis as a mixed question of law and fact and thus finds grounds to 
exclude transfer.23 
This Note analyzes the arguments for and against transferring cases from 
the ICTR to Rwandan domestic courts in light of the ICTR’s 11bis 
procedural requirements and recent Rwandan legislation.  While some 
 
 11. See Higonnet, supra note 4, at 427–29. 
 12. See id. at 427 & n.309. 
 13. See Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad 
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 143 (2005). But see RICHARD 
J. GOLDSTONE & ADAM M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 103–04 (2009) 
(noting in particular that the Tribunals were never intended to be permanent institutions). 
 14. S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). 
 15. S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
 16. See The President of the ICTR, Report on the Completion Strategy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 50, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2009/247 (May 14, 2009) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009]. 
 17. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis. 
 18. ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 44, 50. 
 19. See Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 40 (Dec. 4, 2008) 
[hereinafter Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision]. 
 20. See, e.g., ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16, at ¶ 50 (“The 
Government of Rwanda is in the process of further amending its laws in order to remove any 
remaining legal hurdles for the transfer of cases from the Tribunal to be heard in Rwanda.”). 
 21. See infra Part I.B.3.a–b. 
 22. See infra Part I.B.3.c. 
 23. See infra Part I.B.3.c. 
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literature has focused on the issue of transferring cases from the ICTR to 
Rwanda, such scholarly work has considered 11bis in the context of the 
now obsolete pre-2007 Rwandan domestic law.24  This Note, then, aims to 
revisit the transfer issue—in particular, the ICTR’s continual refusal to 
transfer cases to Rwanda—in light of the country’s recent legislation and 
judicial reform.  In Part I, this Note discusses the background of the 
formation of the ICTR, its jurisdictional relationship with domestic courts, 
in particular Rwanda’s, and the applicable Rwandan laws pertaining to 
genocide cases transferred from the ICTR.  This Note then discusses the 
ICTR’s methodology in determining whether to transfer a case to a national 
jurisdiction.  In so doing, this Note conducts a brief comparison with the 
ICTY methodology, drawing upon rulings in referral cases from both 
tribunals in order to illustrate how the Tribunal treats requests for transfers 
to Rwanda differently from requests to other venues. 
In Part II, this Note discusses the opposing viewpoints concerning the 
transfer requirements, mainly those in support of the Tribunal’s emphasis 
on due process requirements and those who advocate that the ICTR should 
place greater importance on the overall purposes and goals of the Tribunal. 
Finally, in Part III, this Note argues that when considering jurisdictional 
limits and priorities in cases involving international courts and the courts of 
the country in which and against whose citizens the crimes were committed, 
countervailing judicial interests may outweigh an assurance of the strict 
application of Western due process protections in the home country.  A 
multiplicity of factors—such as the contribution a particular case may have 
toward furthering the Tribunal’s goals of facilitating the national justice and 
reconciliation processes and buttressing the domestic judiciary—should be 
weighed against the Tribunal’s interests in guaranteeing the defendants’ 
right to a fair trial through the assurance of specific due process protections.  
Such a particularized assessment would comprise a comprehensive 
balancing approach, considering both adequate due process protections for 
the defendant and factors contributing to the overall interest of justice. 
I.  FROM THE KILLING FIELDS TO THE HALLS OF JUSTICE:  THE RWANDAN 
GENOCIDE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IT CREATED, AND THE RESULTING 
LEGAL REGIMES 
This part explores the historical and legal background of the ICTR and 
applicable transfer jurisprudence.  Specifically, this section discusses the 
post-genocide situation of Rwanda and its role in the formation of the 
ICTR, the ICTR’s mandate in relation to courts of national jurisdiction, the 
Tribunal’s and Rwanda’s transfer regimes, and, finally, how the ICTR has 
applied its transfer requirements to Rwanda to date.  This history illustrates 
how, despite Rwanda’s efforts at creating a legal regime compliant with 
 
 24. See, e.g., Alhagi Marong, Charles Chernor Jalloh & David Kinnecome, Concurrent 
Jurisdiction and the ICTR:  Should the Tribunal Refer Cases to Rwanda?, in FROM HUMAN 
RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159, 165 (Emmanuel Decaux, Adam Dieng & 
Malick Sow eds., 2007). See generally infra Part II.A. 
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ICTR standards and its own national interest in adjudicating these genocide 
cases, the Tribunal continues to insist that the Rwandan system falls short 
of meeting its stringent transfer requirements. 
A.  The 100 Days and Its Court:  The Rwandan Genocide and the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
1.  General History of the Genocide and the Need for an International Court 
In 1994, Rwanda witnessed the most brutal genocide the world has seen 
since the Holocaust.  In less than 100 days, the extremist Hutu Power 
regime mobilized the masses to massacre around 500,000 to 1,000,000 
fellow Rwandans, targeted for their Tutsi “ethnicity” or moderate Hutu 
views.25  The machetes of the Hutu killing machine exceeded the Nazis’ 
profane efficiency at its peak, at a killing rate five times higher than that of 
the Nazi apparatus.26  After the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
defeated the genocidal regime, the country was left in shambles and the 
judiciary was utterly destroyed.27  Not one court was left operating28 and of 
the roughly 800 lawyers and judges in Rwanda before the genocide, only 
forty were still alive.29  The population was traumatized and impoverished 
and the infrastructure lay in ruins.30 
Yet despite the lack of human and material capital, the new Rwandan 
government announced that it would prosecute all those who participated in 
the atrocities.31  The government immediately embarked upon an 
aggressive policy of arresting and detaining those suspected of participating 
in the genocide, often arresting anyone who appeared to be a genocidaire.32  
The numbers of those arrested steadily increased over the ensuing years, 
rising from around 10,000 detainees in 1994 to 130,000 by 1998, at a rate of 
one thousand to three thousand per month.33 
 
 25. See Peter H. Sennett & Gregory P. Noone, Working With Rwanda Toward the 
Domestic Prosecution of Genocide Crimes, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 425, 430 
(1997); see also Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice:  The Case of the 
Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 766 & n.5 
(2007) (“Most writers estimate the number of Tutsi deaths during the genocide to be in the 
range of 500,000 to 1,000,000.”).  For a detailed account of the Rwandan genocide, see 
PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH 
OUR FAMILIES:  STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998). 
 26. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1246. 
 27. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness:  Counseling the Accused in 
Rwanda’s Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 565 (1998); 
Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction:  The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 352–53 (1997). 
 28. See Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law:  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 421, 435 (1994). 
 29. Carroll, supra note 1, at 172. 
 30. See L. Danielle Tully, Note, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca 
Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 385 (2003). 
 31. See id. at 389. 
 32. See Drumbl, supra note 27, at 565–66. 
 33. Tully, supra note 30, at 389; see also Carroll, supra note 1, at 189–90; Raper, supra 
note 7, at 28. 
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At the outset, it was apparent to the GOR that it did not have the physical 
capacity to try the accused for genocide.34  Therefore, the government 
asked the United Nations Security Council, of which Rwanda was a 
member at the time, to convene an international tribunal to adjudicate cases 
related to the 1994 genocide.35  The Security Council responded by passing 
Resolution 955, thereby establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda.36  The Council listed six motivating factors and purposes in the 
resolution:  1) concern that genocide and other “systematic, widespread, and 
flagrant violations of international humanitarian law” were committed in 
Rwanda; 2) concern that the situation constituted a “threat to international 
peace and security;” 3) to put a stop to such atrocities and punish the 
perpetrators; 4) to use the prosecutions to facilitate the “process of national 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace;” 5) that the 
prosecutions will aid in halting violations and provide redress; and 6) to 
strengthen the courts in Rwanda, especially regarding the volume of 
suspects.37 
Although the motivating factors for the resolution largely dealt with 
Rwanda’s domestic concerns—in fact, only the second point, “threat to 
international peace and security,” constitutes the legal basis for international 
intervention under a Chapter VII U.N. Security Council action38—the 
Rwandan government very quickly disagreed with elements of the resultant 
Tribunal’s form and function.39  Specifically, Rwanda protested 1) the 
Tribunal’s limited temporal jurisdiction, 2) its rather limited personnel and 
resources, 3) its lack of prioritization of cases to be tried, 4) the 
participation of countries complicit in the genocide in the formation of the 
Tribunal, 5) that those convicted will be imprisoned outside of Rwanda, 6) 
 
 34. In fact, in the first five years after the genocide, Rwandan courts heard 3700 of over 
125,000 cases—around three percent of all prisoners. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1287–88. 
 35. See S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“[The Security 
Council] [d]ecides hereby, having received the request of the Government of Rwanda . . . to 
establish an international tribunal . . . .”); Carroll, supra note 1, at 175; Todd Howland & 
William Calathes, The U.N.’s International Criminal Tribunal, Is It Justice or Jingoism for 
Rwanda?  A Call for Transformation, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 135, 141 (1998); Marong et al., 
supra note 24, at 165; Madeline H. Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide:  The Case of 
Rwanda, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 689, 690 (1997). 
 36. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, ¶¶ 1–8. 
 37. Id. preambular paras.  Scholars have noted that the motivating factors of the 
individual member States of the Security Council for forming the ICTR were far from 
unanimous.  For instance, Russia emphasized retributory punishment, France the hope that 
public prosecutions would contribute towards establishing peace, the United Kingdom, 
Spain, and others the hope that justice would contribute towards reconciliation, while the 
Czech Republic disagreed, noting that reconciliation is far too complex. See Howland & 
Calathes, supra note 35, at 143–44.  For an exhaustive presentation of the member States’ 
motivating factors, see U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 
1994) [hereinafter 955 Meeting]. 
 38. U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.”). 
 39. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 14–16. 
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the prohibition of the use of the death penalty, and 7) that the Tribunal’s 
seat would be located outside of Rwanda.40 
Regarding the first point, the GOR was concerned that the Tribunal’s 
temporal jurisdiction, limited to the year of 1994,41 would exclude those 
who took steps in planning and preparing the genocide prior to that time 
from prosecution and thus not serve to “eradicat[e] the culture of impunity 
or creat[e] a climate conducive to national reconciliation.”42  Some 
members of the Rwandan delegation were convinced that the Security 
Council negotiations and the resulting resolution were just a “fig-leaf-after-
the-fact” to hide the international community’s apathy during the genocide 
and an attempt to set a precedent, together with the ICTY, toward 
establishing an international criminal court.43  Rwanda’s delegate to the 
Security Council at the time echoed this concern, stating that “the 
establishment of so ineffective an international tribunal would only appease 
the conscience of the international community rather than respond to the 
expectations of the Rwandese people and the victims of genocide.”44  In 
turn, Rwanda voted against the resolution—the only Security Council 
member to do so.45  Nevertheless, after the vote the Rwandan government 
agreed to cooperate with the Tribunal and has supported it, to varying 
degrees, since.46  This tenuous relationship between the Rwandan 
government and the ICTR never fully dissipated and is evident throughout 
the subsequent jurisdictional conflict and in the current controversy over 
whether to transfer cases from the ICTR to the national Rwandan courts. 
This conflict over the Tribunal’s transfer mechanism can only be 
understood in the context of the ICTR’s primary concurrent jurisdiction in 
relation to national jurisdictions, as outlined in the following section. 
2.  The ICTR and Primary Concurrent Jurisdiction 
The establishment of the ICTR marked the first time the principles of 
primacy and concurrent jurisdiction—as well as virtually any other 
principle of international law—were applied to a conflict that was not 
 
 40. See id.  Eventually, points one, two, six, and seven became the real points of 
contention between the ICTR and the Rwandan government. See Erika R. George, After 
Atrocity Examples from Africa:  The Right to Education and the Role of Law in Restoration, 
Recovery, and Accountability, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 59, 71 (2007); Morris, supra 
note 27, at 353–57. 
 41. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 42. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 14–15.  Professor Madeline Morris suggests that the 
temporal mandate may not be as limiting as the Rwandan delegate to the Security Council 
feared, when considered together with the Tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction, if “aiding 
and abetting prior to 1994 of crimes that were completed in 1994” is ruled to be within the 
Tribunal’s mandate. Morris, supra note 27, at 354. 
 43. Morris, supra note 27, at 357. 
 44. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 15. 
 45. See id. at 15–16. 
 46. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 1, at 180–81 (noting that, despite Rwanda’s “tenuous” 
relationship with the ICTR, Rwanda’s Government (GOR) “believed it was in Rwanda’s 
best interest” to cooperate with the Tribunal).  For an example of the Tribunal’s strained 
relationship with the GOR, see supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
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international in nature.47  Previous international tribunals, such as the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II and the ICTY, were 
convened in the aftermath of conflicts that were of clear international 
character.48  While this may have been a significant departure from most 
international humanitarian law doctrine,49 international actors circumvented 
this legal obstacle by framing the conflict in international terms, 
characterizing the scale of the atrocities as a threat to international 
stability.50  Moreover, Rwanda, the country whose sovereignty was at issue, 
supported the departure from established doctrine when it specifically 
requested that the international community assist in prosecuting genocide 
offenders, given the condition of its own shattered judiciary.51 
Thus sidestepping this academic debate regarding applying international 
law to a domestic conflict, the international community—acting under the 
aegis of the U.N. Security Council—invested the ICTR with primary 
concurrent jurisdiction.  Rather than exclusive, the ICTR exercises 
concurrent jurisdiction because it shares subject matter, temporal, and 
territorial jurisdiction with any other state that exercises jurisdictional 
claims over Genocide cases.52  Yet it also exercises primacy in that it may 
compel states with competing jurisdictional claims to transfer a case to the 
Tribunal.53  This primary concurrent jurisdiction is at the root of the transfer 
debate between Rwanda and the ICTR. 
a.  Concurrent Jurisdiction 
The ICTR’s concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, particularly 
Rwanda’s, created a situation where multiple courts could claim jurisdiction 
over a particular case.  Concurrent jurisdiction “describes any situation 
where two or more national courts or at least one national court and an 
international court have legal authority to adjudicate the same issue.”54  The 
Statute of the ICTR55 makes it clear that the Tribunal and domestic courts, 
including those of Rwanda, share jurisdiction over genocide cases.  Article 
8(1) of the Statute states that “[t]he International Tribunal for Rwanda and 
national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in 
 
 47. See Magnarella, supra note 28, at 431. 
 48. See id.  Though technically military tribunals, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
are generally viewed as marking the beginning of the age of the international ad hoc tribunal 
system. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 40–64; George, supra note 40, at 61. 
 49. See Magnarella, supra note 28, at 431 (“[T]he ICTR represents an important 
extension of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts.”). 
 50. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 3–4, 6–7. 
 51. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 52. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 162–63. 
 53. See Morris, supra note 27, at 365. 
 54. Marong et al., supra note 24, at 162. 
 55. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
1602 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
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the territory of neighboring States.”56  This is an explicit recognition that 
cases relating to the 1994 Genocide and falling within the stated territorial, 
temporal, and subject matter jurisdiction can be heard in either domestic 
courts or at the Tribunal. 
Specifically, Security Council Resolution 955 empowers the Tribunal to 
“prosecut[e] persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations 
of International Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations 
committed in the territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994.”57  In particular, the ICTR has subject matter 
jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II, as defined by the ICTR Statute.58  The Tribunal has 
territorial jurisdiction over “the territory of Rwanda including its land 
surface and airspace as well as to the territory of neighboring States”59 and 
temporal jurisdiction covering the “period beginning on 1 January 1994 and 
ending on 31 December 1994.”60  The ICTR’s jurisdiction is thereby clearly 
delineated. 
However, Rwanda’s own jurisdiction over cases relating to the 1994 
Genocide is not in dispute.  After all, 
Rwanda can establish jurisdiction over those indicted by the ICTR under 
the territoriality principle (almost all of the crimes occurred on Rwandan 
soil), the nationality principle (the crimes were committed by Rwandans, 
and . . . all of the suspects whose cases may be transferred to Rwanda are 
Rwandan), and the passive personality principle (the victims were 
Rwandan).61 
Other states may also try to claim jurisdiction over international war crimes 
and crimes against humanity under theories of universal jurisdiction.62  Yet 
since Rwanda has traditional jurisdictional claims over those cases 
committed in its territory, by its own people, and against its own people, the 
government does not need to resort to such sweeping international legal 
 
 56. Id. art. 8(1). 
 57. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, ¶ 1. 
 58. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, arts. 2–4. 
 59. Id. art. 7. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Marong et al., supra note 24, at 187; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 391–92 
(discussing the traditional sources of national jurisdiction over international crimes). 
 62. Generally, universal jurisdiction is the legal principle that recognizes the right “of all 
states to prosecute those believed to be responsible for certain special crimes of concern to 
the entire international community,” which “[t]oday . . . applies to the serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.” Brown, supra note 5, at 392.  Some states have invoked this 
principle to initiate their own proceedings against perpetrators of crimes occurring in 
Rwanda in 1994.  Judge Andrew Merelles of Spain has issued indictments against high-
ranking Rwandan officials on charges of committing atrocities on the side of the RPF and 
Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) between 1990 and 2002 on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction. See generally The Spanish Indictment of High-Ranking Rwandan Officials, 6 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1003 (2008). 
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principles.63  Since Rwanda and the ICTR then explicitly share jurisdiction 
over the same crimes, it was inevitable that they at times would both seek 
jurisdiction over the same case.64 
The question then, is how to determine which court—foreign, Rwandan, 
or the Tribunal—should hear a case concerning the 1994 Genocide.65  The 
Security Council’s solution to this jurisdictional dilemma is to mandate the 
primacy of the international Tribunal over any other court that may assert a 
competing claim. 
b.  The ICTR’s Primacy Over Cases of Concurrent Jurisdiction 
The relationship between the ICTR and domestic courts, including those 
of Rwanda, is complicated by the fact that the Tribunal is given primacy 
over cases falling within its jurisdiction.  The principle of primacy 
stipulates that the ICTR has superior claims to cases that fall within its 
subject matter, temporal, and territorial jurisdiction.66  This means that at 
any stage of the proceedings, the ICTR can demand that a national court 
transfer a case over which it had previously asserted jurisdiction to the 
Tribunal.67  Once the ICTR chooses to hear a case, national jurisdictions are 
precluded from pursuing litigation for the same crimes.68  In this manner, 
the ICTR preempts national prosecution and prevents the possibility of 
double jeopardy.69  Primacy was chosen for two main reasons.  First, the 
international community wanted to ensure that all genocide cases were to be 
dealt with fairly and judiciously.70  The ability to assert primacy over 
national jurisdictions enables the Tribunal to cure instances where domestic 
courts fail to adequately try perpetrators71 or carry out victor’s justice.72  
Second, by creating an international body that has the ability to 
authoritatively rule on all cases relating to international criminal law 
regarding the Rwandan genocide, the Tribunal can serve to add to the 
burgeoning corpus of international humanitarian law.73  This section 
discusses, in more detail, the nature of primacy of the ICTR in relation to 
other courts and the rationale for its implementation. 
 
 63. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 187 (“[W]ithout looking to universal 
jurisdiction . . . Rwandan national courts have several independent bases for asserting 
jurisdiction over genocide-related crimes.”). 
 64. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 180; Morris, supra note 27, at 362–63. 
 65. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 164. 
 66. See Morris, supra note 27, at 365. 
 67. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 28(2)(e). 
 68. See id. art. 9(1) (“No person shall be tried before a national court for acts 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, 
for which he or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 99. 
 71. See Brown, supra note 5, at 404. 
 72. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172–73.  For an explanation of victor’s justice, see infra 
notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 73. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 103; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 
408 (asserting that primacy is the only way “to ensure uniformity in the legal process” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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The ICTR’s primacy is outlined in its founding documents.  Article 8(2) 
of the ICTR Statute states that the Tribunal “shall have primacy over the 
national courts of all States,” and that “[a]t any stage of the procedure, the 
[ICTR] may formally request national courts to defer to its competence.”74  
Further, since the ICTR was established via a Chapter VII Security Council 
Resolution, all United Nations Member States are bound to comply.75  
Resolution 955 makes requisite compliance explicit, stating 
all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal . . . in 
accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the [ICTR] and 
that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their 
domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and 
the Statute, including . . . orders issued by a Trial Chamber.76 
Further clarifying the relationship between the Tribunal and national courts, 
Article 28 of the ICTR Statute states that “[s]tates shall cooperate with the 
[ICTR] in the investigation and prosecution of persons.”77  Therefore, not 
only are states obligated to comply with the Tribunal’s directives 
concerning carrying out arrest warrants,78 detaining suspects,79 providing 
evidence,80 and the like, states are obligated to transfer any cases falling 
within the ICTR’s jurisdiction that the Tribunal may request.81 
It is important to note, in this respect, that the nature of the ICTR’s 
primacy is not one of traditional judicial review, as is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s primacy over lower courts in the United States.82  Rather, the 
ICTR’s primacy is one of first instance,83 in which the Trial Chamber can 
request a domestic court to transfer a case, at any stage of the proceedings 
 
 74. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 8(2). 
 75. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”). 
 76. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, ¶ 2. 
 77. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 28(1).  Article 28 continues to enumerate specific 
instances of required cooperation, stating: 
States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an 
order issued by a Trial Chamber, including but not limited to: 
  (a) The identification and location of persons; 
  (b) The taking of testimony and the production of evidence; 
  (c) The service of documents; 
  (d) The arrest or detention of persons; 
  (e) The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda. 
Id. art. 28(2). 
 78. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 56 (“The State to which a warrant of arrest or a transfer 
order for a witness is transmitted shall act promptly and with all due diligence to ensure 
proper and effective execution thereof, in accordance with Article 28 of the Statute.”). 
 79. See id. 57 (“Upon the arrest of the accused, the State concerned shall detain 
him . . . .”). 
 80. See id. 8 (“[The Prosecutor] may request the State to forward to him all relevant 
information in that respect, and the State shall transmit to him such information forthwith in 
accordance with Article 28 of the Statute.”). 
 81. See id. 10(C) (“The State to which the formal request for deferral is addressed shall 
comply without undue delay in accordance with Article 28 of the Statute.”). 
 82. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1315. 
 83. See id. 
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and from any level of court.84  In a specific sense, though, under the 
Tribunal’s usage of non bis in idem, the ICTR may also act as a court of last 
resort in the instance that the Tribunal finds a national proceeding to be 
inadequate.85  While no domestic court may try a suspect for crimes falling 
under the ICTR’s jurisdiction “for which he or she has already been tried by 
the [ICTR],”86 the ICTR may try someone who was already tried before a 
domestic court providing 1) the Tribunal finds that the national court 
characterized the crime as “ordinary,” 2) the “domestic proceedings were 
not impartial or independent,” 3) the proceedings “shield[ed] the accused 
from international criminal responsibility,” or 4) “the case was not 
diligently prosecuted.”87  Despite this authority to review national 
proceedings, the Tribunal’s main purpose nevertheless is to hear cases in 
the first instance.88 
Powerful theoretical reasoning buttresses the principle of primacy.  First, 
there is a “perennial danger” of national courts characterizing international 
crimes as “ordinary crimes” and operating to “defeat the very purpose of the 
creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the very 
people whom it has been designed to prosecute.”89  Therefore, international 
tribunals in general may be inclined to assert their primacy in cases where 
“national trials lack credibility in making fair determinations . . . for serious 
international crimes,”90 as the ICTR’s non bis in idem exception reinforces.  
Second, international tribunals’ primacy may be used to promote and 
protect “compelling humanitarian interests in the context of a situation 
identified as a threat to international peace and security.”91  Ensuring the 
ability of international tribunals to try international crimes against humanity 
provides an opportunity to develop international legal precedent and 
norms.92 
Finally, in the case of Rwanda, the Commission of Experts that made 
recommendations to the Security Council before the drafting of Resolution 
955 was worried that, “given the scale and brutality of the 
crimes . . . committed,” prosecution in Rwanda “would lead to vengeance 
 
 84. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 8(2) (“At any stage of the procedure, the 
[ICTR] may formally request national courts to defer to its competence.” (emphasis added)); 
see also Harhoff, supra note 5, at 574 (“[T]he Tribunal may request national courts to defer 
to the competence of the Tribunal at any stage in their procedures.”). 
 85. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 9.  The doctrine of non bis in idem, commonly 
referred to as “the double-jeopardy bar,” generally bars a defendant from being tried more 
than once for the same offense. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1150 (9th ed. 2009). 
 86. Id. art. 9(1); see also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 87. Id. art. 9(2).  This implicitly allows for the Tribunal’s Trial Chambers to hear a case 
that was heard on appeal by a national supreme or high court as long as one of the above 
conditions is met. 
 88. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1315. 
 89. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. 
 90. Brown, supra note 5, at 407. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 103; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 
408. 
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and ‘victor’s justice.’”93  Victor’s justice is generally defined as a post-
conflict judicial process in which “the victors exercis[e] judicial revenge on 
the vanquished.”94  In such a situation, primacy may be necessary to ensure 
that justice is carried out fairly and without bias.95 
The above justifications for primacy deal with situations in which, in the 
interests of justice, the ICTR must compel domestic jurisdictions to defer to 
its authority.  The issue is complicated, however, when the discussion turns 
to whether to transfer a case from the ICTR to a national jurisdiction such 
as Rwanda, rather than to compel a case transfer from a national jurisdiction 
to the Tribunal.96  In fact, jurisdictional conflict and related concerns over 
sovereignty, which came to the fore during ICTR and ICTY proceedings, 
influenced the similar yet distinctly different system of complementarity 
that forms the basis of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction.  
The next section briefly explores complementarity as practiced by the ICC, 
the continued relevancy of debates regarding other theories of jurisdiction 
in light of the ICC, and how Rule 11bis, in effect, has the capability of 
transforming the primacy of the ICTR to a modified system governed by 
complementarity. 
c.  Complementarity, the International Criminal Court, and the Future of 
Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The creation and operation of the Rwandan and Yugoslav ad hoc 
tribunals contributed significantly to the subsequent formation of a 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) and the form that it took.97  
Aside from learning from their successes, the drafters of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)98 were aware of some of 
the difficulties the ICTs encountered, including issues concerning primary 
concurrent jurisdiction and sovereignty, particularly Rwanda’s tension with 
the ICTR.99  Guided by these concerns, the drafters invested the ICC with 
 
 93. Carroll, supra note 1, at 172; see also Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186 (there 
exists “the possibility . . . in the case of Rwanda, that authorities will mete out victor’s 
justice”). 
 94. GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 64; see also Carroll, supra note 1, at 172; 
Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186; Morris, supra note 27, at 371. 
 95. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172–73; see also Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186. 
 96. Professor Morris describes concurrent jurisdiction as “stratified,” which, in her view, 
can lead to “anomalies of inversion,” in which an inverse disparity is created wherein the 
leaders of the genocide, tried at the ICTR, receive more protections and softer punishments 
than lesser criminals tried locally in Rwanda. Madeline H. Morris, Rwandan Justice and the 
International Criminal Court, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 351, 354 (1999); Morris, supra 
note 27, at 371–72.  For a more detailed discussion of possible negative effects of primacy 
and how it influences the transfer discussion, see infra Part II.B.1.a. 
 97. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 110; Brown, supra note 5, at 416–30; 
Morris, supra note 27, at 362–73. See generally Morris, supra note 96; Evo Popoff, Note, 
Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law:  Can the International 
Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 363 (2001). 
 98. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002 
[hereinafter Rome Statute].  The Rome Statute is the ICC’s founding document. 
 99. See Morris, supra note 96, at 355. 
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complementary jurisdiction instead of primacy, in which the Court may 
only hear a case if domestic courts normally exercising jurisdiction prove 
unwilling or unable to do so.100  Despite the ICC’s mission of becoming a 
permanent international court, further exploration of the ad hoc system’s 
transfer requirements is necessary largely because:  1) the courts conduct 
similar analyses of when it may be necessary to invoke transfer; 2) the ICC 
most likely will not preclude the formation of other ad hoc or hybrid 
international courts; and 3) a workable transfer regime may allow the ICTR 
to more readily reach its 2013 deadline. 
The ICTs’ application of their transfer requirements, though markedly 
different than those of the ICC, may prove useful in the ICC’s future 
interpretation of its own transfer requirements.  Like the primacy of the 
ICTs, complementarity is a subset of concurrent jurisdiction.  However, in 
contrast with the ICTs, the ICC cannot compel a domestic court to transfer 
a case to the court unless it determines that the domestic court is “unwilling 
or unable to act.”101  The “unwilling or unable” requirement, however, does 
invoke an analysis similar to that of an ICT transfer decision—the domestic 
judicial system may have collapsed or become overwhelmed (and is thus 
“unable” to try perpetrators) or may choose to prosecute either to suppress 
dissidents, mete out victor’s justice, or let perpetrators off the hook (and is 
thus “unwilling”).102  Even in light of complementary jurisdiction, then, an 
exploration of the ICTs’ transfer analysis may continue to prove useful in 
the pursuit of determining when the ICC should defer to a domestic 
judiciary.103 
Moreover, even with the advent of the ICC, there is no consensus that the 
ad hoc or hybrid systems have been replaced.104  The hybrid system—thus 
far including such courts as the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East 
Timor (SPSC), Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)—integrates 
aspects of Western judicial systems and traditional judicial methods.105  
Both independent international systems can fill gaps where the ICC cannot 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction—it may only hear cases concerning 
state parties to the Rome Treaty that arose after July 1, 2002 and relate to 
genocide, crimes against humanity, serious war crimes, and crimes of 
 
 100. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 113; Morris, supra note 96, at 355. 
 101. See Morris, supra note 96, at 356. 
 102. See id. at 356–58. 
 103. Cf. id. (extrapolating from the ICTR experience situations when the ICC should 
confer with domestic courts). 
 104. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 115–30; Higonnet, supra note 4, at 348–
49; Zachary D. Kaufman, Book Review, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 209, 212 (2007) 
(reviewing Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:  
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2006)). See generally James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring:  Rethinking Hybrid War 
Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616 (2005) (discussing the future of the hybrid 
system); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”:  Remedial Deterrence in 
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (2008). 
 105. See generally David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Cambodia:  “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007). 
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aggression.106  For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was 
convened in 2007 for the sole specific purpose of investigating the 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.107  In any 
event, it is not hard to imagine a scenario where an international court will 
once again face the question of when to begin to defer to a national 
jurisdiction that exercises traditional sovereign jurisdiction over the 
trials.108  Ad hoc tribunals may thus be necessary in situations involving 
crimes or incidents that do not fit the ICC’s limited temporal and subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
 Finally, as the ICTs have extended their mandate, now until 2013,109 
a workable transfer system may enable the tribunals to meet this new 
deadline.  In fact, Professor William Burke-White illustrates that the 
transfer system, as applied at the ICTY, has enabled the Tribunal to begin to 
relieve its caseload.110  He asserts that as applied by the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
the monitoring and revocation mechanisms included in 11bis have in fact 
transformed the ICTY’s jurisdiction from primary to modified 
complimentary, in which the Tribunal will continue to transfer cases to the 
Bosnian courts unless the domestic courts, subsequent to transfer, prove 
themselves to be unwilling or unable.111  This has not, however, been the 
practice with respect to Rwanda.  Rather, the Rwanda Tribunal has 
continued to apply a strict reading of the 11bis transfer requirements, thus 
denying transfers to the Rwandan courts.112  Therefore, the implementation 
of a similar workable ICTR transfer regime may likewise ease the 
Tribunal’s docket. 
The preceding section detailed the ICTR’s jurisdictional relationship with 
domestic courts, how such primary concurrent jurisdiction has created 
conflicts between the Tribunal and Rwandan courts, and how the resolution 
of this conflict may impact the future of both the specific operations of the 
ICTR and broad operations of the international system.  The next sections 
detail the ICTR’s transfer requirements, Rwanda’s legislative attempts to 
meet those requirements, and the Tribunal’s application of the transfer 
requirements with respect to Rwanda and Europe.  A proper understanding 
 
 106. See Rome Statute, supra note 98, arts. 5, 11, 12. 
 107. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 124–34. 
 108. See Amelia S. Canter, Note, “For These Reasons, The Chamber:  Denies the 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral”:  The False Hope of Rule 11 Bis, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1614, 1656 (2009). 
 109. See ICTR/UN—ICTR Appeals Chamber to Continue Work Until Mid-2013, 
HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (June 12, 2009), http://www.hirondellenews.com/
content/view/12483/179/. 
 110. See William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal 
Tribunals:  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation 
of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 328–35 
(2008) (describing how the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) used the 11bis transfer mechanism specifically to help fulfill its Completion 
Strategy). 
 111. See id. at 319–28.  For an explanation of the Tribunal’s monitoring and revocation 
mechanisms, see infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra Part I.B.3.c. 
1288 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
of the Tribunal’s transfer requirements, Rwanda’s responses, and the 
ICTR’s application of the rule to the Rwandan context is necessary to 
evaluate whether transfer is appropriate and justified. 
B.  The ICTR’s Transfer Regime:  Sending a Case from the Tribunal to a 
National Jurisdiction 
The United Nations Security Council has laid out the guidelines for a 
broad transfer policy to help facilitate the ICTR’s completion of its mandate 
by 2010.113  Security Council Resolution 1534 calls upon the ICTR to 
implement a completion strategy in order to “complete all work in 2010,” 
which can in part be achieved by transferring cases to “competent national 
jurisdictions.”114  Resolution 1534 draws upon Resolution 1503, which 
specifically urges the ICTR to “formalize a detailed strategy . . . to transfer 
cases involving intermediate and lower-rank accused to competent national 
jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda.”115  Consistent with this 
directive, the ICTR Prosecutor, in his June 4, 2009 statement to the Security 
Council, acknowledged that “[s]uccessful completion of the Tribunal’s 
mandate . . . depends on a large extent on the ability of the Tribunal to 
transfer the cases of nine (9) of the fugitives and some of the detained 
indictees for trial within Rwanda and other national jurisdictions.”116  To 
date, the ICTR Prosecutor has successfully transferred fifty-five non-
indicted suspects to Rwanda and one to Belgium,117 in accordance with the 
discretionary latitude the Prosecutor is given when dealing with non-
indicted suspects.118  However, the Trial Chamber has approved transfer of 
only two indicted suspects, both to France.119  Otherwise, all other attempts 
 
 113. At the time of this writing, the Appeals Chamber has extended the deadline to mid-
2013 at the earliest. See supra note 109. 
 114. S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 15, ¶¶ 3–4. 
 115. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 116. Hassan B. Jallow, Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICTR to the U.N. Security 
Council (June 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/
155/Default.aspx?id=1029). 
 117. See Hassan B. Jallow, Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICTR to the U.N. Security 
Council (June 18, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/
Default.aspx?id=1144) (bringing the total number of cases transferred up to fifty-five); THE 
ISSUES AT STAKE IN THE CLOSURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY) AND RWANDA (ICTR) 6 (2009) [hereinafter ISSUES AT STAKE], 
available at www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/NoteTPI521ANG2009.pdf; Marong et al., supra note 
24, at 160; Møse, supra note 8, at 672. 
 118. See The President of the ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 39, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/358 (June 1, 
2006) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, June 2006] (“[T]he decision to transfer cases 
to national jurisdictions is a judicial one in cases where indictments exist . . . .”); Møse, 
supra note 8, at 672 (“Such transfers [of non-indicted suspects] depend on prosecutorial 
discretion and are administrative in nature, based on cooperation between the ICTR 
Prosecutor and national prosecuting authorities.”). 
 119. See Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France 
(Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision]; Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, 
Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Laurent 
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to transfer indicted defendants to national jurisdictions, including Rwanda, 
have failed.120  The reason for this discrepancy between the success of non-
indicted referrals and the failure of indicted referrals is the Tribunal’s strict 
application of Rule 11bis’ transfer requirements, which applies solely to 
referral requests for indicted suspects.121  Chiefly, as the remainder of this 
section illustrates, the Tribunal’s strict interpretation of 11bis’ fair trial 
requirement has been an obstacle to transferring cases from the Tribunal to 
Rwanda. 
1.  Requirements for Transfer to a National Jurisdiction Under Rule 11bis 
The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide a mechanism 
whereby the Tribunal may transfer a case to a national jurisdiction.  Rule 
11bis stipulates the conditions under which the Tribunal may transfer an 
indictment to another court.122  The rule outlines, inter alia, to which 
suspects it applies,123 to which states it applies,124 certain judicial and due 
process thresholds such states must meet,125 and monitoring126 and 
revocation mechanisms.127  In considering transfer requests, the Tribunal 
has been mostly concerned with ensuring the defendants’ right to a fair trial 
in the transfer country.128 
If the Prosecutor wishes to transfer the case of an indicted defendant to a 
national jurisdiction, she must submit a request to the President of the 
ICTR, who in turn designates a Trial Chamber to conduct a hearing on 
whether the transfer is acceptable.129  While an accused cannot be tried in 
 
Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Bucyibaruta, Transfer 
Decision]. 
 120. See ISSUES AT STAKE, supra note 117, at 7.  The Prosecutor submitted five cases to 
the Trial Chambers for consideration for transfer to Rwanda; all requests were denied.  Three 
of those five were subsequently heard and denied on appeal. See id.; see also ICTR 
Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16, ¶ 50.  Additionally, the ICTR denied the 
referral of one case to Norway, subsequently granted referral to the Netherlands, but then 
revoked such referral when a Dutch court ruled it did not have jurisdiction over an unrelated 
case involving crimes against humanity. See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-
2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecution’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Revocation of the 
Referral to the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pursuant to Rule 11bis(F) & (G), ¶¶ 11–12 
(Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Bagaragaza, Referral Revocation Decision]. See generally 
Alhagi Marong, The ICTR Transfers Michel Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for Trial, ASIL 
INSIGHTS, (June 18, 2007), http://www.asil.org/insights070618.cfm. 
 121. See ICTR Completion Strategy, June 2006, supra note 118, ¶ 39; ISSUES AT STAKE, 
supra note 117, at 6–7; Møse, supra note 8, at 672–74. 
 122. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis.  The ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence were 
written pursuant to Article 14 of the ICTR Statute, which calls for the judges of the Tribunal 
to adopt such rules. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 14. 
 123. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A). 
 124. See id. 11bis(A)(i–iii). 
 125. See id. 11bis(C), (D)(ii). 
 126. See id. 11bis(D)(iv). 
 127. See id. 11bis(F). 
 128. See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
 129. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A), (B).  The Trial Chamber may order such a referral 
on its own accord as well. See id. 11bis(B). 
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absentia,130 the Trial Chamber may conduct a referral hearing if the suspect 
is not yet in custody.131  In order for a state to have jurisdiction over a case, 
the state must be one “(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or 
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or (iii) having jurisdiction and being 
willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case.”132  If the Trial 
Chamber finds that the requested host state satisfies one of the three 
jurisdictional requirements, the Chamber must also satisfy itself that “the 
accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that 
the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”133 
A key element in determining the sufficiency of a national jurisdiction 
under 11bis is whether the transfer country possesses a legal framework 
under which it may try crimes similar to the Tribunal.134  The Appeals 
Chamber, in accordance with the view of the Trial Chambers, has read a 
general competency requirement into 11bis’s requirements for national 
jurisdiction.135  Competency, according to the Tribunal, is a judicial 
determination in which a Trial Chamber “must consider whether it has a 
legal framework which criminalizes the alleged conduct of the accused and 
provides an adequate penalty structure.”136  To satisfy the first prong, the 
 
 130. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 20(4)(d) (“[T]he accused shall be 
entitled . . . (d) [t]o be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person 
or through legal assistance . . . .”). 
 131. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A) (“If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or 
not the accused is in the custody of the Tribunal, the President may designate a Trial 
Chamber [to] determine whether the case should be referred to the authorities of a State.” 
(emphasis added)).  Therefore, the Prosecutor may submit referral requests for the nine 
fugitives as he proposed, even if they are already indicted. See Jallow, supra note 116; see 
also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-05-85-I, Designation of a Trial 
Chamber for the Referral of the Case to a State, ¶ 3 (July 11, 2007) (granting request to 
designate Trial Chamber for a referral hearing even though “the accused is not in the custody 
of the Tribunal”). 
 132. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A)(i–iii). 
 133. Id. 11bis(C). 
 134. See infra note 136. 
 135. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (“Rule 
11bis of the Rules allows a designated Trial Chamber to refer a case to a competent national 
jurisdiction for trial . . . .”); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 4 
(Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision] (same); 
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4 (same). 
 136. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4; 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4; Munyakazi, Appeals 
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4.  Courts apply the same general competency 
test to analyze whether states have jurisdiction and are “adequately prepared” for the 
purposes of Rule 11bis(A)(iii). See Bucyibaruta, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶ 8 (“In 
determining whether or not a State has jurisdiction within the meaning of Rule 11bis . . . the 
Chamber must consider whether such a State has a legal framework which criminalizes the 
alleged conduct of the accused and provides an adequate sentencing structure.”); 
Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶ 8 (“In assessing whether or not a State 
has jurisdiction within the meaning of Rule 11bis, the Chamber must consider whether such 
a State has a legal framework which criminalizes the alleged conduct of the accused and 
provides an adequate sentencing structure.”); Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-
2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment to the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, ¶¶ 9–12 (Apr. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Bagaragaza, Trial 
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Tribunal must find that the state has criminalized the alleged conduct as an 
international crime listed in the Statute and not as a mere “ordinary” 
crime.137  International crimes codified by the transfer state need not be 
identical to those listed in the ICTR, but rather “similar in substance.”138  
To satisfy the second prong, “[t]he penalty structure within the State must 
provide an appropriate punishment for the offences for which the accused is 
charged, and conditions of detention must accord with internationally 
recognized standards.”139 
If the Tribunal is satisfied that the transfer state meets the competency 
requirement, it then “shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair 
trial.”140  In so doing, the Tribunal considers “whether the accused will be 
accorded the rights set out in Article 20 of the Tribunal’s Statute.”141  
Article 20 of the ICTR Statute lists the defendants’ rights, such as the right 
of the presumption of innocence, to be tried without undue delay, to be tried 
in one’s own presence, the right to an attorney and, if the defendant is 
indigent, to be provided one free of charge, and the right to examine and 
cross examine witnesses for the prosecution and defense under the same 
conditions.142  Through the application of Article 20(2) of the ICTR 
 
Chamber’s Transfer Decision] (conducting the same competency test to determine whether 
the Netherlands has jurisdiction and is adequately prepared to try to the case). 
 137. See Bucyibaruta, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶ 8 (“A case can be referred to 
the national courts of a State only where the State concerned will charge and convict the 
persons responsible for those international crimes listed in the Statute as opposed to ordinary 
law crimes.”); Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 136, ¶ 11 (“The 
Tribunal only has authority to refer cases where the State ‘will charge and convict [or acquit] 
only for those international crimes listed in its Statute’ as opposed to ‘ordinary crimes’ such 
as homicide.” (quoting Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, Decision 
on Rule 11bis Appeal (AC), ¶ 16 (Aug. 30, 2006) (alteration in original)); see also 
Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 6–12 (analyzing 
whether Rwandan law adequately criminalizes the charged crimes in accordance with Rule 
11bis). 
 138. Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 21 (finding Rwandan law sufficiently 
similar to the Statute’s definition of criminal responsibility). 
 139. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (citing 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4); Kanyarukiga, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4 (citing Munyakazi, Appeals 
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4); Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer 
Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4 (citing Prosecutor v. Radovan Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-
PT, Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11bis, ¶ 32 (May 17, 2005)). 
 140. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(C); see also Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer 
Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (“The Trial Chamber must also consider whether the accused 
will receive a fair trial . . . .”); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 
135, ¶ 4; Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4. 
 141. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (“The Trial 
Chamber must also consider whether the accused will receive a fair trial . . . .”); 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4; Munyakazi, Appeals 
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4. 
 142. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 20.  In its entirety, Article 20 provides for the 
equality of all persons before the Tribunal; the right to a fair and public hearing; the 
presumption of innocence; the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges; 
adequate time and access to facilities to prepare a defense; the right to communicate with an 
attorney of one’s own choosing; the right to be tried without undue delay; the right to be 
tried in one’s own presence; the right to representation of an attorney, to be informed of this 
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Statute,143 which invokes Article 21’s protection of witnesses,144 as well as 
Article 20’s equal access to witnesses provision,145 the Tribunal also 
requires the transfer state to provide an effective witness protection 
program.146  Lastly, Rule 11bis(C) specifies that “the death penalty will not 
be imposed or carried out” in the transfer state.147 
Rule 11bis also provides for certain safeguards to help ensure the 
administration of justice and states’ compliance with due process 
proceedings.  Specifically, Rule 11bis(D)(iv) provides that “the Prosecutor 
may send observers to monitor the proceedings in the courts of the State 
concerned,”148 while 11bis(F) provides that the ICTR, at the request of the 
Prosecutor, may revoke the transfer order at any time before the state court 
reaches a verdict.149  While the Tribunal recognizes the benefit of these 
safeguards, it has held that they alone may not be sufficient to overcome a 
defect in a state’s ability to provide an enumerated due process right, such 
as witness protection, especially since the decision to send monitors and 
request revocation lies within the discretion of the Prosecutor.150  In sum, 
then, the Tribunal has interpreted and applied 11bis to mean that a transfer 
country must have a legal framework which criminalizes the conduct of the 
accused, must not impose the death penalty, and must guarantee that 
defendants will receive a fair trial by ensuring each of the defendants’ rights 
stipulated in the ICTR Statute.  Barring the satisfaction of any of the 
requirements—despite the monitoring and revocation mechanisms—the 
 
right, and, if indigent, to be provided with one free of charge; the right to examine and cross 
examine witnesses for the prosecution and defense under equal conditions; the provision of 
an interpreter free of charge; and the right not to testify against oneself or be compelled to 
confess guilt. See id. 
 143. Id. art. 20(2) (“[T]he accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to 
Article 21 of the Statute.”). 
 144. Id. art. 21 (“The [ICTR] shall provide . . . for the protection of victims and 
witnesses.”). 
 145. Id. art. 20(4)(e). 
 146. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 40 
(denying referral motion in part because of lack of adequate protection of and access to 
witnesses); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 35 
(dismissing the prosecution’s grounds for appeal based on inadequate witness protection); 
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 45 (dismissing the 
prosecution’s grounds for appeal based on inadequate witness protection). 
 147. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(C). 
 148. Id. 11bis(D)(iv). 
 149. Id. 11bis(F). 
 150. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 29 
(holding that the Trial Chamber’s error in failing to consider certain monitoring mechanisms 
was inconsequential, as “these procedures and remedies would not necessarily solve the 
current problems related to the availability and protection of witnesses” and that monitoring 
and revocation “lie within the sole discretion of the Prosecution”); Kanyarukiga, Appeals 
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 38 (“[T]hese procedures and remedies would 
not necessarily solve the current problems related to the availability and protection of 
witnesses [and] the decision to send monitors and the right to request . . . revocation lie 
within the sole discretion of the Prosecution.”); Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 94 
(holding that although the monitoring system in place “has led to the rejection of some of the 
objections against transfer . . . monitoring will not . . . solve the problems relating to 
availability and protection of witnesses”). 
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Tribunal will not transfer a case to a national jurisdiction.151  This next 
section discusses Rwanda’s attempts at legislating to meet the ICTR’s high 
standard under 11bis. 
2.  Rwanda’s Legislative Responses to 11bis Requirements 
The government of Rwanda implemented Organic Law No. 11/2007 
(Transfer Law) as part of a continuous effort to align Rwandan law dealing 
with transfer cases from the ICTR with the ICTR Statute itself in order to 
facilitate the successful transfer of cases from the ICTR to Rwandan 
courts.152  The Transfer Law created a dual system in Rwanda, in which 
certain legal provisions, procedures, and guarantees apply specifically to 
cases transferred from the ICTR or other states to Rwanda but not to cases 
that originate in the domestic system.153  Contrary to genocide cases that 
originate in Rwandan courts,154 those that are transferred from the ICTR are 
heard exclusively by the High Court in the first instance155 and by the 
Supreme Court on appeal.156  Similarly, in the event that the Transfer Law 
may conflict with any other law, the provisions within the Transfer Law 
prevail.157 
Since the enactment of the Transfer Law, the GOR has continuously 
written and updated legislation in response to the ICTR’s denial of 
referrals.158  The preambular paragraphs to the Transfer Law itself state that 
the Parliament adopted the law “[c]onsidering [the] Statute of the [ICTR] 
and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence [and] [c]onsidering . . . particularly 
the requirements to transfer cases from the ICTR to national jurisdictions, 
 
 151. See infra Part I.B.3.c. 
 152. See Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
Mar. 19, 2007, Preamble. 
 153. See id. art. 24. 
 154. The 2004 Gacaca Law categorizes genocide crimes into three categories. See Law 
No. 16/2004 of June 19, 2004, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, June 19, 2004, 
art. 51, modified and complemented by Law No. 13/2008 of 19/05/2008, available at 
http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?ActDo=all&Information_ID=1262&
Parent_ID=30692916&type=public&Langue_ID=An&rubID=30692917.  All cases except 
those involving people who planned and organized the genocide or those who held 
significant leadership positions and participated in or encouraged others to participate in the 
genocide (the first two subsections of the first category) are heard in the gacaca courts. See 
id. arts. 2, 51.  Those aforementioned exceptions are heard by ordinary or military courts. 
See id. art. 2. 
 155. See Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 2. 
 156. See id. art. 16. 
 157. See id. art. 25. 
 158. See, e.g., Security Council Meeting 6134, supra note 10, at 31.  Rwandan Prosecutor 
General Martin Ngoga addressed the Council, saying, 
[d]espite [2008’s] disappointing decision by the Trial and Appeals Chambers to 
reject the Prosecutor’s request to transfer cases to Rwanda . . . we have undertaken 
a review and proposed amendments to the law governing the transfer of cases and 
the law abolishing the death penalty, and we have established a witness protection 
unit within the judiciary. 
Id. 
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including Rwanda.”159  As a result, the Transfer Law and its progeny 
include expansive due process protections and severe limitations on the 
application of the death penalty (resulting in its eventual abolishment) in 
order to accord with the ICTR’s 11bis transfer requirements. 
a.  The Transfer Law’s Due Process Protections 
The Transfer Law provides for extensive due process protections for 
defendants, in tandem with the ICTR Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.  Article 13 enumerates the rights of the accused in a virtually 
identical manner to those listed in Article 20 of the ICTR Statute.160  Some 
have argued that Rwanda already guaranteed these rights through its 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul 
Charter)161 together with Rwanda’s Constitutional provision making 
international treaties “more binding than organic laws and ordinary 
laws.”162  Regardless of such prior obligations, Rwanda’s implementation 
of the Transfer Law makes such obligations explicit.163  Additionally, 
Article 14 of the Transfer Law guarantees that the GOR shall provide 
“appropriate protection for witnesses and shall have the power to order 
protective measures similar to those set forth in Articles . . . of the ICTR 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”164  Further, Article 14 guarantees the 
government’s facilitation of witnesses living abroad and confers upon them 
“immunity from search, seizure, arrest or detention during their testimony 
and during their travel to and from the trials,” along with the provision that 
the High Court may establish additional protections it deems necessary to 
 
 159. Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
Mar. 19, 2007, Preamble. 
 160. Compare Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Rwanda, Mar. 19, 2007, art. 13, with ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 20. 
 161. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 190–91; Tully, supra note 30, at 403–04.  
Article 14 of the ICCPR includes a virtually identical list of rights, see International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at 176–77 
[hereinafter ICCPR], as does Article 7 of the Banjul Charter. See African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, at 60 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].  
Rwanda ratified the ICCPR on April 16, 1975 and the Banjul Charter on July 15, 1983. See 
Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 27 n.44. 
 162. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA OF 04 JUNE 2003 art. 190.  
Rwanda’s Constitution also enumerates certain due process guarantees. See id. arts. 16, 18–
20; see also Marong supra note 24, at 191. 
 163. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 27–32. 
 164. Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 14.  Specifically, the Transfer Law guarantees those measures mentioned 
in rules 53, 69, and 75 of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See id.  Those 
measures include the non-disclosure of any materials, information, or the identity of 
witnesses or victims in the interests of justice. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 53, 69, 75.  
Additionally, in 2009, ICTR staff began training the Rwandan Witness Protection Service as 
well as establishing a video link system for allowing long distance testimony, which “should 
take care of the concerns related to witness protection and provide an alternative for the 
taking of evidence of witnesses who may be reluctant to travel to Rwanda.” Hassan B. 
Jallow, Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICTR to the U.N. Security Council (Dec. 3, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1035). 
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guarantee their safety.165  The Transfer Law also provides specific 
protections for the defendants’ attorneys, ensuring the right to travel within 
Rwanda unencumbered and to be free from search, seizure, and arrest, as 
well as the right to security at their own request.166  Last, in accordance 
with Rule 11bis, the Transfer Law provides for the possibility of the 
presence of ICTR monitors during the domestic trial process and recognizes 
the Tribunal’s right to revoke the transfer.167  Thus, the Transfer Law 
addresses the main procedural and due process mechanisms that are present 
in the ICTR Statute and Rules.  The Transfer Law similarly addresses the 
ICTR’s concerns regarding the application of the death penalty in Rwandan 
courts. 
b.  From the Death Penalty to Life Imprisonment 
Prior to 2007, the fact that Rwanda still practiced the death penalty was 
the major obstacle preventing the consideration of the transfer of cases from 
the ICTR to Rwanda’s national courts.168  As noted above, according to 
ICTR Rule 11bis(C), “the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself . . . that the 
death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”169  Given the fact that 
one of Rwanda’s major objections to the formation of the ICTR was the 
Tribunal’s prohibition of the death penalty,170 its dissonance with Rule 
11bis(C)’s provisions is clear.  As a result, while Rwanda maintained the 
death penalty—even during its years of disuse171—the ICTR would not 
seek transfer due in large part to the country’s legal allowance of capital 
punishment.172 
Rwanda’s difficulty in meeting 11bis requirements is evident in the 
ICTR’s refusal to recognize Rwanda’s subsequent abolition of the death 
penalty as sufficient to cure Rwanda’s 11bis deficiency with respect to 
capital punishment.  In July 2007, the Rwandan parliament passed Organic 
Law No. 31/2007 (Death Penalty Abolition Law), thereby abolishing the 
 
 165. Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 14. 
 166. See id. art. 15. 
 167. See id. arts. 19, 20 (establishing that the ICTR Prosecutor has “the right to designate 
individuals to observe the progress of cases transferred to Rwanda in accordance with article 
11bis D) iv) of the ICTR Rules” and recognizing that “[i]n the event the ICTR revokes [a 
transfer order] pursuant to Rule 11bis . . . the accused shall be promptly surrendered to the 
ICTR”). 
 168. See The President of the ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 36, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/951 (Dec. 8, 
2006) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, Dec. 2006] (“Transfer of cases to Rwanda 
raises several issues.  One involves the death penalty, which is applicable in genocide cases, 
though only rarely implemented.”);  cf. Marong et al., supra note 24, at 201 (“[R]eferrals to 
Rwandan authorities would not be appropriate unless the Rwandan government addresses 
problems relating to fair trials through legal reforms and official abstention from the use of 
the death penalty.”). 
 169. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(C); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 195 (noting that there have been no executions 
for genocide-related crimes in Rwanda since 1998). 
 172. See ICTR Completion Strategy, Dec. 2006, supra note 168, art. 36. 
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death penalty.173  After its passage, many thought that this law would 
enable the ICTR Prosecutor to successfully request referrals to Rwanda.174  
Additionally, the Transfer Law, passed just four months earlier, stipulates 
that “life imprisonment shall be the heaviest penalty imposed upon a 
convicted person in a case transferred to Rwanda from ICTR,” effectively 
abolishing the death penalty for ICTR transfer cases.175  Encouraged by the 
Rwandan legislation, the ICTR Prosecutor submitted three requests for 
referral to Rwanda shortly after the passage of the Death Penalty Abolition 
Law,176 soon followed by two others.177 
However, the Tribunal has since repeatedly held that the provisions in the 
Death Penalty Abolition Law, though sufficient to ensure against the 
imposition of the death penalty, have in fact created another problem:  the 
Law allows for the possibility of the imposition of the penalty of prolonged 
life imprisonment in isolation for transfer cases.178  Though not enumerated 
in Rule 11bis or the ICTR Statute, the Tribunal held that prolonged 
imprisonment in isolation may be in violation of a defendant’s rights and 
therefore would not sanction transfers to Rwanda.179  And while the 
Tribunal recognized that prolonged detention in isolation has not been 
definitively recognized as a violation of a human right,180 it ruled that the 
possibility of such imposition, arising from an ambiguity in the law, is 
sufficient to deny transfer.181  This ambiguity arises from the question of 
whether the Death Penalty Abolition Law or the Transfer Law is 
 
 173. See Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
July 25, 2007, available at http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php? 
Information_ID=2088&Parent_ID=30698444&type=public&Langue_ID=An#a30698445. 
 174. See, e.g., The President of the ICTR, Report on the Completion Strategy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 35, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2007/676 (Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, Nov. 2007 (“Since 
the recent abolition of the death penalty in Rwanda . . . the Prosecutor has filed three 
requests in terms of Rule 11bis for the referral to Rwanda for trial of the cases of three of the 
accused . . . .  The requests are pending judicial determination.”); ICTR/Transfer—The 
Transfer Policy of the ICTR Prosecutor Takes Another Hit, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY 
(Aug. 24, 2007), http://hirondellenews.com/content/view/9825/340/ (“The only 
option . . . for these countries that refuse to try persons accused of genocide would be to 
extradite them to Rwanda, which is henceforth possible due to its new law that abolishes the 
death penalty.”). 
 175. See Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 21. 
 176. See ICTR Completion Strategy, Nov. 2007, supra note 174, ¶ 35. 
 177. See The President of the ICTR, Report on the Completion Strategy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 50, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2008/322 (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2008] (noting 
the number of transfer requests pending at five). 
 178. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 31–
38; Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 6–17; Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–21. 
 179. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38. 
 180. See Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, ¶ 
25 (June 19, 2008) [hereinafter Hategekimana, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision]. 
 181. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38. 
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controlling.182  The issue in contention is whether the Death Penalty 
Abolition Law’s provision for “life imprisonment with special provisions” 
may apply to transfer cases,183 or whether the maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment as provided in the Transfer Law applies.184  The Tribunal 
held the ambiguity lies in whether the Transfer Law, as the law directly on 
point (lex specialis), overrides the possibly contradicting Death Penalty 
Abolition Law provision, or whether the latter overrides the former as it is 
later in time, under the principle lex posterior derogate priori.185  Since the 
Tribunal was unable to determine which law is controlling, it erred on the 
side of caution and concluded that it was unable to ensure that “life 
imprisonment with special provisions” will not be applied by the Rwandan 
courts, and therefore, in large part, denied the referral requests.186 
Once again responding to the ICTR’s latest decisions denying referrals to 
Rwanda, largely on the basis of the above ambiguity regarding life 
imprisonment, the Rwandan parliament amended the Death Penalty 
Abolition Act to exclude the possibility of life imprisonment with special 
provisions from cases transferred from the ICTR.187  The Appeals Chamber 
in Prosecutor v. Hategekimana188 noted that, had the amendment entered 
into force, “the ambiguity as to the applicable punishment for transfer 
cases . . . would be resolved.”189  The Tribunal continued, however, that 
since “there is no information . . . to indicate that this law has entered into 
 
 182. See id. ¶ 38 (“The Appeals Chamber is therefore unable to conclude that the 
ambiguity [between the Death Penalty Abolition and Transfer Laws] as to the applicable 
punishment under Rwandan law for transfer cases has been resolved.”); see also 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 16; Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 20. 
 183. See Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
July 25, 2007, art. 4, available at http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php? 
Information_ID=2088&Parent_ID=30698444&type=public&Langue_ID=An#a30698445.  
Specifically, “life imprisonment with special provisions” provides that “1) a convicted 
person is not entitled to any kind of mercy, conditional release or rehabilitation, unless 
he/she has served at least twenty (20) years of imprisonment; 2) a convicted person is kept in 
isolation.” Id.  Article 5 lists the crimes that are subject to this penalty, which include, inter 
alia, “crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.” Id. art. 5. 
 184. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 31–
38; Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 6–17; Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–21. 
 185. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 31–
38; Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 6–17; Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–21. 
 186. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38; 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 16; Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 20. 
 187. See Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 
July 25, 2007, art. 3, modified and complemented by Law No. 66/2008 of 21/11/2008, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Dec. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?Information_ID=2088&Parent_ID=306984
44&type=public&Langue_ID=An#a30698445.  The law reads:  “[L]ife imprisonment with 
special provisions . . . shall not be pronounced in respect of cases transferred to Rwanda 
from the [ICTR] and from other States . . . .” Id. art. 3. 
 188. Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against 
Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis (Dec. 4, 2008). 
 189. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38. 
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force,” the ambiguity remains.190  This strongly suggests that if referrals are 
brought to the Appeals Chamber in the future, this ground of denial will be 
reversed, though not necessarily the others pertaining to fair trial due 
process protections. 
As seen below, when deciding whether to refer cases to Rwanda, the 
Tribunal undertakes a factual analysis to determine whether Rwandan law is 
implemented in practice, in contrast with both the Appeals Chamber’s 
decisions in transferring cases to other countries than Rwanda as well as its 
decisions concerning transfer cases at the ICTY.  Part I.C.3 contrasts the 
Appeals Chamber’s narrow, strictly legal approach to ICTY and ICTR 
transfer requests to Europe with the Chamber’s broad interpretation and 
application of 11bis requirements when evaluating referrals to Rwanda, 
considering both factual allegations concerning the situation within the 
country in addition to its existing laws. 
3.  11bis in Practice:  Transferring Cases to Europe and Rwanda 
a.  The ICTY’s Application of 11bis in Transferring Cases to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Given the similarities between the ICTY’s and ICTR’s form and 
function,191 it is useful to briefly examine the ICTY’s application of its 
transfer requirements, particularly with respect to its successful decisions to 
transfer cases to Bosnia and Herzegovina.192  As the subsequent sections 
illustrate, the ICTY conducts a purely legal analysis of domestic law to 
ensure that such law comports with 11bis requirements, whereas the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber applies both a legal analysis and a factual review of many 
factors, despite defendants’ similar due process concerns in both courts.193 
The comparison between the two Tribunals’ transfer requirements is 
particularly apt because both the ICTY and ICTR share an Appeals 
Chamber194 and, importantly, the ICTR’s Rule 11bis was taken virtually 
verbatim from the Yugoslav Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.195  Further, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1503 urges the 
ICTR to model its completion strategy on that of the ICTY, specifically in 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. See infra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
 192. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 193. See infra notes 198–208 and accompanying text. 
 194. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 13(4) (“The members of the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall also serve as the members of 
the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”). 
 195. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1231 & n.27 (“[T]he international legal community 
responded to atrocity in Rwanda simply by using as boilerplate the Statute of the ICTY . . . 
.”). Compare ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis, with ICTY R. P. & EVID. 11bis.  Most relevant to 
this discussion, ICTY’s Rule 11bis provides that the designated Trial Chamber may refer an 
indictment to a state “(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or (ii) in which the 
accused was arrested; or (iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared 
to accept such a case.” ICTY R. P. & EVID 11bis(A).  The Rules also provide that the Trial 
Chamber must be “satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death 
penalty will not be imposed or carried out.” Id. 11bis(B). 
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facilitating the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions.196  Contrary to the 
ICTR, however, the ICTY has, on numerous occasions, referred cases under 
Rule 11bis to Bosnia and Herzegovina—the country where the defendants 
were accused to have committed atrocities.197  Given the similarities 
between the 11bis requirements and the existence of a shared Appeals 
Chamber, it is useful to compare how the Appeals Chamber applied Rule 
11bis to ICTY cases with how the same court applied a virtually identical 
rule to ICTR transfer cases. 
The ICTY has been primarily concerned with ensuring that the laws of 
the transfer state comport with the requirements of Rule 11bis and has 
refrained from conducting a factual analysis of trial and prison conditions in 
practice.198  In so doing, the Appeals Chamber has satisfied itself that the 
laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantee a fair trial, including, the right to 
a fair and public hearing, adequate time to prepare a defense, right to 
counsel, and equal access to witnesses.199  For example, in Prosecutor v. 
Rasevic & Todovic, the Appeals Chamber held that the Referral Bench did 
not have an obligation to investigate whether access to witnesses was in fact 
guaranteed in practice in Bosnia, but merely to ensure that the law provided 
for such protections.200  The ICTY has similarly found defendants’ fears of 
 
 196. See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 14, preambular paras. (“The Security 
Council . . . urg[es] the ICTR to formalize a detailed strategy, modelled [sic] on the ICTY 
Completion Strategy, to transfer cases . . . to competent national jurisdictions . . . .”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 197. See President of the ICTY, Assessment and Report, ¶ 44, delivered to the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2009/252 (May 18, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Report, May 2009] 
(noting that from 2005 to 2007, eight cases involving thirteen accused were transferred to 
national jurisdictions, ten to Bosnia, two to Croatia, and one to Serbia); see also ISSUES AT 
STAKE, supra note 117, at 6. 
 198. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rasevic & Todovic, Case Nos. IT-97-25/1-AR11bis.1 & IT-
97-25/1-AR11bis.2, Decision on Savo Todovic’s Appeals Against Decisions on Referral 
Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 56 (Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber 
Transfer Decision] (“The Referral Bench correctly considered whether it was satisfied that 
the Appellant would receive a fair trial by establishing that the legislation . . . allows for 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defence.  That is all it was required to do 
pursuant to Rule 11bis of the Rules.”); Prosecutor v. Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-
AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11bis Referral, ¶¶ 44–57 (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 
Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision], available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stankovic/acdec/en/051115.htm (holding that the Trial 
Chamber’s analysis of the applicable Bosnian law is sufficient to guarantee a fair trial); 
Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on Rule 11bis Referral, 
¶¶ 18–30 (Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision], 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stankovic/acdec/en/050901.htm (dismissing defendant’s 
contentions that he would not receive a fair trial in Bosnia in actuality, finding the Trial 
Chamber’s analysis of the applicable law sufficient); see also Marong et al., supra note 24, 
at 182, 185. 
 199. See, e.g., Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, 
¶¶ 49–84; Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 41–62; 
Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 18–30; Marong et al., 
supra note 24, at 181–85. 
 200. See Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 63 (“The Referral Bench 
was only required to ascertain whether the provisions concerning the measures which may 
be ordered by the State Court of [Bosnia and Herzegovina] for the protection of witnesses, 
do not unfairly impinge upon the Appellant’s right to a fair trial.”). 
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receiving victor’s justice in Bosnian courts201 to be without merit, 
emphasizing the professional role of judges in the courtroom.202  
Additionally, the Appeals Chamber has repeatedly held that Rule 11bis’ 
monitoring and revocation provisions in part guarantee the defendants’ right 
to a fair trial in the transfer country, when considered with the Tribunal’s 
other findings regarding fair trial protections.203  While defendants have 
repeatedly made allegations that Bosnia’s laws are not implemented in 
practice,204 that they would risk receiving victor’s justice,205 and that 
monitoring and revocation are insufficient safeguards due to the fact that 
only the Prosecutor can recommend monitoring and revocation,206 the 
Tribunal has only thus far implemented a strict procedural application of the 
11bis ICTY transfer rule.207  This is in stark contrast to the Appeals 
Chamber’s review of ICTR transfer requests, wherein, as detailed below in 
Part I.B.3.c, the Chamber has conducted a factual review of many factors, 
particularly the availability of witness protection, and questioned the 
sufficiency of monitoring and revocation mechanisms regardless of the 
adequacy of the Rwandan laws in place.208 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber appears chiefly concerned with the 
existence of enumerated due process protections in law and not the practical 
application of such laws.  This may be due to the ICTY’s involvement with 
the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  As part of the ICTY’s completion 
 
 201. See, e.g., Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 42 
(“[T]he Appellant submits that the Referral Bench failed to properly inform itself . . . (vi) 
about the existence of potential prejudice towards the Appellant if his case is referred to the 
authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”). 
 202. See id. ¶ 53 (“The Appellant has not demonstrated that such statements would cause 
prejudice towards his right to a fair trial, as the judges at the [Bosnia and Herzegovina] State 
Court are professional . . . judges.”). 
 203. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 82–
84 (finding that the Referral Bench did not err in “satisf[ying] itself that the appellants would 
receive a fair trial in part on the basis of Rule 11bis(D)(iv) monitoring and the Rule 11bis(F) 
revocation mechanisms”); Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, 
¶¶ 55–57; Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 52 (“The 
Appellant is . . . wrong to suggest that it was improper for the Referral Bench to have 
satisfied itself that the Appellant would receive a fair trial in part on the basis  [of the] 
monitoring and the . . . revocation mechanism.”). 
 204. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 50 
(“[T]he Appellant argues that the Referral Bench focused on whether there was a legal 
framework in place, instead of assessing whether such a framework was in fact 
implemented.”); Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 42 (“The 
Appellant argues that the legal structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina in itself is insufficient to 
guarantee a fair trial and that further inquiry into the implementation of the necessary 
standards was required.”); Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, 
¶ 19 (“[The defendant] notes that the Referral Bench was satisfied that there are legal 
instruments in place that could result in a fair trial, but that finding, he asserts, is not enough:  
those legal instruments must actually be shown to be in use.”). 
 205. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 80; 
Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 42. 
 207. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 181–85. 
 208. See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. 
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strategy,209 the Tribunal has assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina in setting up 
a special court to hear cases related to genocide and war crimes.210  This 
court is comprised of both international and Bosnian judges, a fact upon 
which the Tribunal places much importance.211  Professor Burke-White 
emphasizes the role that the monitoring and revocation mechanisms play in 
ensuring fair trials in the Bosnian context.212  The threat of revocation, he 
argues, “encourage[s] national courts to meet a relatively high standard of 
justice.”213  In this view, the threat of revocation, then, is a sufficient stick 
to the carrot of transfer to incentivize domestic judges to comport with 
international fair trial standards.214  Thus, the ICTY is confident in 
transferring cases to the Bosnian state courts, despite concerns that there 
still remains a question over whether an adequate defense is possible at 
all.215  Therefore, it may well be that the international community is aware 
of whether Bosnian due process laws are enforced216 or, if inequities result, 
that the ICTY is able to confidently recall the case to The Hague.217 
The above discussion presents a concise analysis of ICTY 11bis rulings, 
focused on those issues relevant to the Rwandan context.  The preceding 
issues—mainly the Tribunal’s analysis regarding fair trial provisions and 
monitoring mechanisms—are the most directly analogous to and distinct 
from the Appeals Chamber’s concerns regarding transferring cases to 
Rwanda under the ICTR’s Rule 11bis.218  With respect to transfer 
applications, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has also ruled on defendants’ 
challenges to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction,219 the adequacy of national courts 
to hear genocide and war crimes cases,220 and disputes over which national 
court has a “greater nexus” to grant jurisdiction,221 among other related 
 
 209. See President of the ICTY, Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 6, delivered to the 
Security Council and General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (Sept. 4, 2002) 
[hereinafter ICTY Report, Sept. 2002]; see also MICHAEL BOHLANDER, THE TRANSFER OF 
CASES FROM INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS TO NATIONAL COURTS 2–21 (2004), 
available at http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/English\News\events\
Nov2004\Bohlander.pdf. 
 210. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 2–21; GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 
105. 
 211. See, e.g., Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 53 (“The 
Appellant has not demonstrated that such statements would cause prejudice towards his right 
to a fair trial, as the judges at the [Bosnia and Herzegovina] State Court are professional—
and partly international—judges.” (emphasis added)). 
 212. See Burke-White, supra note 110, at 322–29. 
 213. Id. at 325. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 346. 
 216. Cf. BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 8 (noting that international judges would only be 
necessary until standards “consistent with those expected by the international and national 
community” were developed). 
 217. See Burke-White, supra note 110, at 322–29. 
 218. See infra Part I.B.3.c. 
 219. See, e.g., Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 10–17. 
 220. See, e.g., Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 19–27. 
 221. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 32–
48; Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 28–40. 
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issues.  Yet while the ICTY’s application of 11bis transfer requirements is 
distinct from the ICTR’s application of the Rule to referrals to Rwanda, its 
approach is similar to the Rwanda Tribunal’s application of the transfer rule 
to non-Rwandan venues.  The next section describes the ICTR’s similar 
concern with 11bis’ legal requirements, absent factual determinations, when 
considering transfer requests to non-Rwandan venues. 
b.  The ICTR’s Application of 11bis in Transferring Cases to Non-Rwandan 
Venues 
The ICTR has, on a few occasions, considered referral requests to non-
Rwandan jurisdictions and has therefore had to conduct and apply an 
analysis of 11bis requirements accordingly.  The ICTR has thus far granted 
two referral requests to France222 and one to the Netherlands,223 though the 
latter request was revoked after a Dutch court ruled that the Netherlands 
does not exercise jurisdiction over certain international crimes.224  While, in 
these cases, the ICTR Trial Chambers have been primarily concerned with 
ensuring that the French and Dutch courts have personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction over cases relating to the Rwandan genocide225—a concern not 
as relevant in referral requests to Rwanda due to its unquestioned 
jurisdiction under traditional notions of national jurisdiction226—the 
decisions also deal with some of the due process issues that have arisen in 
both the ICTY and Rwanda transfer cases.227 
Similar to the Appeals Chamber’s rulings in ICTY transfer cases, the 
ICTR Trial Chambers is primarily concerned with the adequacy of 
European law guaranteeing fair trial and monitoring provisions and the non-
imposition of the death penalty and thus refrains from conducting a factual 
analysis of whether such laws are enforced.228  For example, in evaluating 
whether the defendant will receive a fair trial in France, the Tribunal in 
Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta229 determined that France’s ratification of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and ICCPR as 
 
 222. See generally Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119; Bucyibaruta, 
Transfer Decision, supra note 119. 
 223. See generally Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 136. 
 224. See Bagaragaza, Referral Revocation Decision, supra note 120, ¶¶ 11–12 (granting 
the Prosecutor’s request for revocation of the transfer order after finding that Dutch courts 
ruled that they do not have jurisdiction to hear cases relating to the genocide and war 
crimes). 
 225. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 5–17; Bucyibaruta, 
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 5–17; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer 
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 8–30. 
 226. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 227. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bucyibaruta, 
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer 
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39. 
 228. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bucyibaruta, 
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer 
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39. 
 229. Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Laurent 
Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007). 
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well as its own domestic law suffice to guarantee such rights without 
conducting a factual analysis of its application.230  Similarly, the Tribunal 
has held, without explaining its reasoning, that France’s and the 
Netherlands’ attestations that equal access to witnesses and trial monitoring 
is guaranteed under law and in practice are sufficient for the purposes of 
11bis.231  The Tribunal’s willingness to accept Western European countries’ 
due process guarantees may be explained by the international community’s 
general acceptance of the existence of such protections in Western 
democracies. 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal does not offer this general acceptance nor its 
familiarity with Western legal systems as reason for its disinclination from 
conducting a factual review.232  Rather, much like the Appeals Chamber’s 
ICTY 11bis rulings, the ICTR seems to view a factual analysis in these 
cases not only unnecessary but beyond its purview.233  This solely law-
oriented method is inapposite to the ICTR’s treatment of 11bis 
determinations concerning transfers to Rwanda.  As the next section 
illustrates, when determining whether to transfer a case to Rwanda, the 
ICTR is willing to investigate not only applicable (and possibly sufficient) 
Rwandan law but also context-specific situations inside the country and, 
based on those factual findings, deny transfer. 
c.  The ICTR’s Application of 11bis in Transferring Cases to Rwanda 
Compared to the ICTY’s application of 11bis to transferring cases to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ICTR’s application of 11bis to France and 
the Netherlands, the Rwanda Tribunal treats the transfer question as a 
mixed question of law and fact when considering whether to transfer a case 
to Rwanda.  Under this approach, the Tribunal applies a strict analysis of 
both Rwandan law and practice to evaluate whether Rwanda’s judicial 
system meets Rule 11bis’ strict requirements.234  Though noting the 
progress of Rwanda’s judicial system and the (general) sufficiency of its 
 
 230. See Bucyibaruta, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 21–24. 
 231. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bucyibaruta, 
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer 
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39. 
 232. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 20–30 (conducting an 
analysis only of French law pertaining to fair trial, witness protection, and monitoring 
mechanisms without mentioning any factual application of such law); Bucyibaruta, Transfer 
Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 20–30 (same); Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer 
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39 (conducting an analysis only of Dutch law pertaining to 
fair trial, witness protection, and monitoring mechanisms). 
 233. See supra note 232. 
 234. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 14–
30 (discussing the conditions in Rwanda pertaining to witness availability and monitoring 
mechanisms despite laws providing for such protections); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber 
Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 35 (“[I]f the case were to be transferred to Rwanda, [the 
defendant] might face difficulties in obtaining witnesses residing within Rwanda because 
they would be afraid to testify . . . .”); Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, 
supra note 10, ¶ 47 (holding that the Trial Chamber did not err in considering the conditions 
in Rwanda after considering the applicable Rwandan law). 
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laws, the Tribunal has denied transfer to Rwanda due to factual 
determinations of the situation within Rwanda itself.235  Most recently, the 
Appeals Chamber held that, under 11bis, transfer to Rwanda is 
unacceptable because of the ambiguity in the Transfer Law relating to life 
imprisonment236 and the inability to guarantee defendants’ access to 
witnesses residing both within and outside Rwanda.237  Assuming 
Rwanda’s amended Transfer Law meets the Tribunal’s standards,238 the 
remaining factor preventing transfer to Rwanda is the apparent lack of 
effective witness protection. 
In order to evaluate the conditions within Rwanda, the ICTR has 
accepted amicus briefs from Human Rights Watch,239 the Kigali Bar 
Association,240 and the government of Rwanda,241 among others.  Drawing 
upon the Trial Chambers’ findings from the reports, the Appeals Chamber 
considers whether the political and security situation in Rwanda creates the 
atmosphere intended by the 11bis legal requirements.242  In such a manner, 
the Appeals Chamber has repeatedly upheld the Trial Chambers’ findings 
that although Rwandan law provides for witness protection,243 the evidence 
suggests that witnesses living both within Rwanda and residing abroad may 
 
 235. See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra notes 173–89 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 39–40 
(“[T]he Appeals Chamber has dismissed Ground 3 of the Appeal on the basis that it is unable 
to conclude that the penalty structure in Rwanda will be adequate . . . .  [T]he Trial Chamber 
did not err in concluding that [the defendant’s] right to obtain the attendance of, and to 
examine, Defence witnesses . . . cannot be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda.”); Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 50 (The Appeals Chamber “has 
dismissed the remaining grounds of appeal, which relate to fundamental matters concerning 
whether [the defendant’s] right to obtain the attendance of, and to examine, Defence 
witnesses under the same conditions as [the Prosecution’s] witnesses, can be guaranteed . . . 
and whether the penalty structure in Rwanda is adequate”). 
 238. See supra notes 173–89 and accompanying text. 
 239. See generally Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-1997-36-I, Decision on the 
Request by Human Rights Watch for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae (Mar. 10, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-I, Decision on Defence Request to 
Grant Amicus Curiae Status to Four Non-Governmental Organisations (Feb. 22, 2008) 
(granting status to Human Rights Watch while denying others). 
 240. See generally Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-I, Decision on 
Amicus Curiae Request by The Kigali Bar Association (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-1997-36-I, Decision on the Application by the Kigali Bar 
Association for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae (Dec. 6, 2007). 
 241. See generally Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-I, Decision on 
Request by the Republic of Rwanda, The Kigali Bar Association, The ICDAA, and ADAD 
for Leave to Appear and Make Submissions as Amici Curiae (Dec. 4, 2007) (granting status 
to Rwanda, reserving determination on others); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-
2002-78-I, Decision on the Request of the Republic of Rwanda for Leave to Appear as 
Amicus Curiae (Nov. 9, 2007). 
 242. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 21 
(noting that the Trial Chamber had sufficient information from the amicus briefs to 
determine that defense witnesses experienced harassment in Rwanda). 
 243. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 23; 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 27; Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 38. 
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fear testifying in Rwanda.244  Further, the Appeals Chamber has held that 
although monitoring and revocation mechanisms exist, and while Rwanda 
maintains video-link technology to set up distance testimony for witnesses 
reluctant to travel to Rwanda, such mechanisms are insufficient to 
guarantee the principle of equality of arms between the prosecution and 
defense.245  In other words, even with such protective mechanisms, the 
totality of the circumstances does not remedy the lack of adequate witness 
protection.246  Therefore, the Tribunal concludes, although the Rwandan 
legal system guarantees, in law and in effect, all other 11bis due process 
requirements, its deficiencies in both penalty structure and witness 
protection preclude case transfer to Rwandan national courts.247  In contrast 
with the ICTs’ reluctance to make factual determinations regarding the 
implementation of domestic law when considering transfer to non-Rwandan 
venues, the ICTR has found the failure of adequate implementation of 
Rwandan law as reason to deny transfer to Rwanda. 
The above part demonstrates the historical and political background of 
the formation and composition of the ICTR, as well as the legal 
requirements and hurdles required to transfer a case from the Tribunal to a 
court of national jurisdiction, in particular to Rwanda.  With respect to legal 
structure, Rwanda has continuously revised its legal code in order to meet 
the demands of the Tribunal.  Most significantly, Rwanda enacted the 2007 
Transfer Law and 2008 amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law 
with the hopes of meeting the ICTR’s Rule 11bis requirements.  However, 
to date no cases have been referred to Rwanda, due largely to the ICTR’s 
findings that Rwanda cannot in fact provide adequate witness protection, 
despite laws guaranteeing such protections.  The following part outlines the 
arguments for and against such transfer to Rwanda in particular, with 
specific emphasis on respect for procedural due process on the one side and 
competing conceptions of retributive and rehabilitative justice on the other. 
 
 244. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 22, 26; 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 26, 31. 
 245. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 26–30; 
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 33–39; Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 42–49.  The Tribunal has 
acknowledged that the Prosecutor’s suggested monitor—the African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights (African Commission)—is qualified to monitor domestic proceedings, 
but that monitoring nevertheless is insufficient to cure the witness protection deficiency. See 
Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 29; Kanyarukiga, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 37–38. 
 246. See Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 34; 
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 43; Gatete, Transfer 
Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 64.  The Tribunal has yet to reconsider the matter in light of the 
ICTR’s recent witness protection training program and video-link services. See supra note 
164. 
 247. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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II.  TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER?  DUE PROCESS PROTECTION V. 
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 
This part analyzes the legal and policy arguments for and against 
transferring cases from an international tribunal to national jurisdictions, 
specifically to courts of the country where the greatest nexus of the crimes 
committed occurred—in this case, Rwanda.  Part II.A focuses on the 
position of those who advocate preventing the transfer of cases until certain 
specific due process guarantees are met in the transfer country.  For the sake 
of brevity and due to their emphasis on the importance of guaranteeing the 
protection of certain due process requirements prior to granting transfer, 
this Note labels these opponents of transfer “Protectionists.”248  While 
different “Protectionists” may emphasize different aspects of due process, 
they are united in the high degree of importance they attach to due process 
requirements and the need to buttress international legal standards.  Part 
II.B focuses on the position of those who advocate the importance of 
transferring cases to the nexus country.  These “Foundationalists,” united 
by the emphasis they place on the Tribunal’s goals as enumerated in its 
foundational documents, primarily argue that crimes of mass atrocity must 
be tried in the home country in order to effectuate the trials’ purposes of 
societal rehabilitation and retribution, and in so doing recognize the 
legitimacy of a non-Western method of carrying out justice. 
A.  Protectionists:  Complete Fulfillment of Fair Trial Protection 
Guarantees Before Transfer 
Protectionists oppose the transfer of cases from the ICTR to Rwanda 
unless complete due process protection, as articulated by the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of Rule 11bis, can be guaranteed not only in law but in 
practice in Rwanda.  The Tribunal itself shares this view and therefore 
ICTR transfer decisions help illustrate the position.  Aside from sharing a 
concern for defendants’ rights, Protectionists also advocate keeping cases at 
the Tribunal in order to help establish a consistent set of international legal 
norms and incentivize domestic regimes to undertake meaningful legal 
reform.  Part II.A.1 details the Protectionists’ concern for defendants’ rights 
in domestic courts while Part II.A.2 discusses their aspiration for creating a 
coherent body of international law and domestic legal reform. 
1.  The Risk of Victor’s Justice and Concern for the Rights of the Defendant 
In cases of mass atrocities and international crimes against humanity, 
there is a risk that the home populace will be overeager to convict and 
sentence the accused in order to satisfy the wronged-population’s thirst for 
revenge and desire to hold someone accountable for the crimes committed 
 
 248. It is important to note that neither the opponents nor advocates of transfer comprise a 
monolithic school of legal thought.  Rather, this Note synthesizes the many arguments for 
and against transfer in order to evaluate the arguments in their totality. 
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against them249—what some scholars identify as “victor’s justice.”250  This 
is an acute concern for those who oppose transfer of cases from the ICTR to 
Rwanda.251  To avoid such an outcome, then, due process protections must 
be guaranteed to their fullest and vigilantly guarded in the home country to 
ensure that the defendant will receive a fair trial.252 
Protectionists—largely supported by the Tribunal’s own interpretation of 
11bis—advocate that all due process protections must be met in a transfer 
country prior to referral.253  Absent a single protection, transfer must be 
denied, both for the sake of the defendants’ rights254 and the integrity of the 
legal system.255  Opponents of transfer have argued that the language of 
11bis empowers the Tribunal to look beyond relevant Rwandan law to 
actual practice in Rwanda to determine that transfer is not advisable.256  
International attorneys Alhagi Marong, Charles Cherner Jalloh, and David 
Kinnecome argue that the ICTR should only transfer cases to Rwanda once 
it receives a guarantee from the GOR that a host of due process provisions 
will be met,257 despite the existence of domestic laws that already precisely 
provide those protections.258  The concern is that the laws themselves are 
irrelevant if they are not fully applied.259  To date, and in contrast with the 
Appeals Chamber’s position regarding ICTY transfer cases,260 the Chamber 
has upheld its right to consider the facts on the ground in determining 
whether Rwandan courts will provide a fair trial as they define it.261  In 
 
 249. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172; Morris, supra note 27, at 371.  Some delegates to 
the Security Council in 1994 were sensitive to the accusations that the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals meted out “victor’s justice” and therefore wanted to ensure that such 
accusations could not be leveled against the new Rwanda Tribunal. See Popoff, supra note 
97, at 374–75. 
 250. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 1, at 172; Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186; Morris, 
supra note 27, at 371. 
 251. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172 (“[T]he Commission of Experts . . . worried that 
emotionally, politically, and ethnically charged domestic prosecutions would lead to 
vengeance and ‘victor’s justice’ rather than fair trials.”); Morris, supra note 27, at 371 
(“[D]efendants in national courts will have more reason than defendants tried before an 
international tribunal to fear bias, in the form of victor’s justice or of personal partiality.”). 
 252. See generally Marong et al., supra note 24, at 197–98, 201. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See infra notes 269–80 and accompanying text. 
 255. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 256. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 31 (describing the Defense’s and 
Human Rights Watch’s assertions that “there is a gap between judicial theory and practice” 
in Rwanda); Hategekimana, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 180, ¶ 33 
(describing the Defense’s and amici curiae’s request “to look beyond the relevant Rwandan 
laws and consider Rwanda’s past practices”); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-
2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 
¶ 31 (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision]. 
 257. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 198 (“[T]he government must guarantee that all 
other fair trial standards will be met . . . .”). 
 258. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 259. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-2001-67-I, Brief of Human Rights 
Watch as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Rule 11bis Transfer, ¶¶ 12, 25–111 (Jan. 3, 2008) 
[herinafter HRW Brief]. 
 260. See supra Part I.B.3.a. 
 261. See supra Part I.B.3.c. 
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practice, the Tribunal has preferred a Protectionists’ application of 11bis by 
reading the Rule’s fair trial provision to require a finding that the transfer 
country guarantees a full set of internationally-recognized due process 
protections, in law and in practice, for defendants prior to granting 
transfer.262 
Protectionists urge the Tribunal to read extensive due process 
requirements into 11bis, including conducting a factual analysis out of a 
serious concern for the rights of the defendant263—a concern that has 
dominated the Tribunal’s analysis as well.  In so doing, opponents stress 
that the alleged bias of the Rwandan judiciary and pressures from the 
government would constitute a form of victor’s justice which should 
preclude transfer to Rwandan courts.264  Specifically, the defense and 
human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch argue that the 
Rwandan courts are dominated by ethnic Tutsis, are each comprised of only 
one judge, and are susceptible to biased government pressure.265  While the 
Appeals Chamber eventually ruled that the Rwandan judiciary is 
sufficiently independent from executive influence and that the specific 
number of judges who hear a given case is irrelevant to determining 
whether the trial comports with due process standards,266 the Chamber 
noted that there is indeed a concern of political sensitivity when dealing 
with genocide cases and the judiciary.267  Similarly, the Trial Chambers 
have since ruled that although the individual allegations against the 
Rwandan judiciary are insufficient to prevent transfer on their own, some of 
the concerns are “well-founded,”268 further validating the concerns that the 
opponents of transfer and the Tribunal have regarding transferring cases to 
Rwanda and the high standards domestic judiciaries must meet. 
Similarly, Protectionists tend to evaluate whether Rwanda (or any other 
country) meets 11bis requirements by going through the list of due process 
protections listed in the ICTR Statute one by one and, if finding any of the 
protections lacking, recommend against transfer.269  In practice, the Trial 
Chamber adopts this methodology.  The Chamber addresses the 
 
 262. See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text. 
 263. See HRW Brief, supra note 259, ¶¶ 25–111. 
 264. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 33–38; Hategekimana, Trial 
Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 180, ¶¶ 39, 42–43; Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s 
Transfer Decision, supra note 256, ¶¶ 36–39; see also Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186, 
193, 197, 201. 
 265. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 33–38; see also Hategekimana, Trial 
Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 180, ¶¶ 39, 42–43; Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s 
Transfer Decision, supra note 256, ¶¶ 36–39. 
 266. See Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 26–31 
(overruling the Trial Chamber’s holding that Rwandan courts did not meet standards of 
adequate judicial independence and fairness). 
 267. See id. ¶ 26. 
 268. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 39; Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s 
Transfer Decision, supra note 256, ¶ 42; accord Hategekimana, Trial Chamber’s Transfer 
Decision, supra note 180, ¶ 46. 
 269. See generally Marong et al., supra note 24, at 189–95 (analyzing Rwandan legal 
practice by evaluating whether it meets certain specific enumerated standards, such as equal 
treatment under the law, sufficient pre-trial prison conditions, and witness protection). 
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Defendant’s allegations point by point,270 arriving at the conclusion to deny 
transfer on the basis that one or two fair trial protections are not enforced, 
despite the fulfillment of other requirements.271  While some 
protectionists—such as Human Rights Watch—have asserted that transfer 
should be denied on the basis that the GOR does not provide numerous due 
process protections in practice,272 the Appeals Chamber has found that most 
protections are afforded by the GOR.273  Rather, the Appeals Chamber has, 
on the three occasions it considered the matter, consistently held against 
transfer to Rwanda on the grounds of lack of adequate witness protection 
and uncertainty over the applicable punishment.274  Now that the 
amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law has gone into effect, the 
ambiguity over Rwanda’s penalty structure has most likely been 
resolved.275  Given the Appeals Chamber’s language in Prosecutor v. 
Hategekimana,276 it is likely that the Tribunal would have held that lack of 
adequate witness protection itself, absent the ambiguity over the penalty 
structure or any other due process deficiency, would have been sufficient to 
deny transfer.277  That is to say, in the Tribunal’s Protectionist view, one 
 
 270. See, e.g., Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 33–87 (addressing each of the 
Defendant’s allegations against the Rwandan judicial system:  judicial independence, 
impartiality, and capacity; presumption of innocence; right to an effective defense; 
availability of counsel; legal aid; working conditions; availability and protection of witnesses 
both within and outside Rwanda; double jeopardy; arrest and conditions of detention; and 
life imprisonment with solitary confinement). 
 271. See, e.g., id. ¶ 95.  After considering many different factors under the due process 
rubric, the Trial Chamber held against transfer because there were questions regarding 
whether the Defendant would have sufficient access to witnesses in and outside Rwanda, as 
well as concern over the then-ambiguity concerning the applicable penalty. See id. 
 272. See HRW Brief, supra note 259, ¶¶ 14–16. 
 273. See Munyakazi, Appeals Chambers Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 50 (denying 
transfer of the basis of lack of adequate witness protection and penalty structure while 
overruling Trial Chamber’s other finding of due process deficiencies). 
 274. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 39–40 
(holding that although the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Rwandan law does not 
criminalize command responsibility, that Rwanda does not have mutual assistance 
agreements with other countries, and erred in failing to consider the availability of 
monitoring and revocation mechanisms,  the lack of certain witness protection mechanisms 
and the possible ambiguity over Rwanda’s penalty structure were sufficient to uphold the 
Trial Chamber’s denial of transfer); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, 
supra note 135, ¶¶ 16, 27, 35 (affirming the Trial Chamber’s denial of transfer based on 
ambiguous penalty structure and questions regarding witness protection); Munyakazi, 
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 50 (holding that despite the Trial 
Chamber’s error in holding that the Rwandan judiciary was not independent and impartial, 
lack of adequate witness protection and ambiguity over Rwanda’s penalty structure were 
sufficient to uphold the Trial Chamber’s denial of transfer). 
 275. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 189–89 and accompanying text. 
 277. The Tribunal’s methodology is to consider each ground of appeal separately.  In 
Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, the Prosecution filed three grounds of appeal:  1) that the Trial 
Chamber erred in failing to recognize Rwanda’s criminalization of command responsibility, 
2) that the Trial Chamber erred in holding lack of availability and protection of witnesses, 
and 3) that the Trial Chamber erred in holding that the applicable penalty in Rwanda is 
ambiguous. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 6, 
14, 31.  The Appeals Chamber granted the Prosecution’s first ground of appeal, but denied 
the other two. See id. ¶ 12–13, 30, 38.  It therefore is likely that had the Appeals Chamber 
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significant due process deficiency is enough to outweigh other judicial 
considerations in determining whether to transfer a case from the ICTR to 
Rwanda.278  In fact, a single due process deficiency—assuming allegations 
of witness harassment and intimidation are true279—may be enough to 
prejudice a trial.280  Some Protectionists even suggest that the mere failure 
to complete the 11bis requirements as a procedural checklist, regardless of 
which specific protection is lacking, is reason enough to deny transfer.281 
The Tribunal is keen to look to the facts in Rwanda in addition to the law 
particularly in evaluating witness availability, contrary to its approach in 
ICTY cases.  Protectionists are mostly concerned that the lack of a 
defendant’s ability to access witnesses on his or her behalf to the same 
extent as the Prosecution’s witnesses violates the principle of equality of 
arms and completely undermines the fairness of the trial.282  The Trial and 
Appeals Chambers view access to witnesses as being so integral to due 
process that they have held that the mere possibility of the witnesses’ fear to 
testify in Rwanda, “regardless of whether their fears are well-founded,” is 
enough to determine that defendants will not have sufficient access to 
witnesses and that therefore trials will be inherently unfair.283  Aside from 
specific, isolated instances of harassment and intimidation—which the 
Tribunal notes as reason enough to absolve a witness from alleging specific 
instances of harassment pertaining to her case284—Protectionists point to 
the criminalization of “genocide ideology,” under which one who expresses 
 
granted two grounds of appeal and denied the one regarding witness protection, that singular 
due process deficiency would have still been sufficient to deny transfer to Rwanda. 
 278. This is in line with the Tribunal’s language of recognizing the progress that the 
Rwanda judiciary has made over the years while maintaining that the witness protection 
deficiency casts doubt over the ability to conduct fair trials. See, e.g, Gatete, Transfer 
Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 95 (“The [Trial] Chamber concludes that the Republic of Rwanda 
has made notable progress in improving its judicial system. . . .  However, the Chamber is 
not satisfied that [the Defendant] will receive a fair trial if transferred to Rwanda.  First, it is 
concerned that he will not be able to call witnesses residing outside Rwanda to the extent and 
in a manner which will ensure a fair trial.  Second, it accepts that the Defence will face 
problems in obtaining witnesses residing in Rwanda . . . .”). 
 279. See HRW Brief, supra note 259, ¶¶ 25–40; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW 
AND REALITY:  PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN RWANDA 73–78 (2008) [hereinafter, LAW 
AND REALITY], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda07081.pdf. 
 280. Cf. LAW AND REALITY, supra note 279, at 73 (“Most prosecutions of genocide, like 
many other court proceedings in Rwanda, depend on testimony from witnesses, both for the 
prosecution and the defense.”). 
 281. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 201 (“Given the more explicit requirements of 
11bis, referrals to Rwandan authorities would not be appropriate unless the Rwandan 
government addresses problems relating to fair trials . . . .”). 
 282. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. 
 283. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 22 (emphasis 
added); accord Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 26; 
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 37.  The Tribunal has held 
that instances of known witness intimidation, harassment, arrests, and even torture and 
killings create a general fear to testify without having to prove an individual fear. See, e.g., 
Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 21–22.  The Tribunal 
also notes that the criminalization of “genocide ideology” acts to make people fear that if 
they testify on behalf of one accused of genocide, they too will be charged. See id. ¶ 21. 
 284. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 21. 
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extremist Hutu views may be incarcerated, as a sufficient deterrent to 
witness testimony to preclude the possibility of a fair trial.285  Yet the 
criminalization of genocide ideology notwithstanding, the Transfer Law 
guarantees protection for defendants’ witnesses, including immunity from 
prosecution for testifying.286  Therefore, while the Tribunal’s concern over 
the impairment of a fair trial due to lack of witness availability may be well-
founded, this is a key instance where the ICTR looks beyond the law in 
evaluating 11bis requirements.  This beyond-the-law approach is in stark 
contrast with the Tribunal’s hesitancy to evaluate the facts concerning 
witness protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina.287 
This section dealt with Protectionists’ concern for defendants’ due 
process guarantees, asserting that such guarantees are intrinsic to assuring a 
fair trial.  Under this theory, transfer should be delayed until such 
protections are fully provided not only in law but in practice.  The next 
section presents the Protectionists’ belief that these trials should be 
conducted mainly in the international courts in order to buttress the 
international system and encourage domestic legal reform. 
2. Toward Establishing a Consistent Set of International Legal Norms and 
Incentivizing Domestic Judicial Reform 
Another argument opposing the transfer of cases from international 
tribunals to national jurisdictions is that such tribunals serve to establish 
international legal standards288 as well as encourage domestic legal systems 
to adopt Western legal norms.289  Regarding the former, by keeping cases in 
the ad hoc tribunal system, international legal theorists hope to create a 
substantive body of international criminal law with precedential value, 
which could act to deter (or at minimum, punish) acts of mass violence and 
genocide in the future.290  There is widespread agreement that the existence 
of and lessons learned from the tribunals were a crucial step in the 
formation of international law and subsequent international courts.291  In 
fact, the international community has noted that the formation of the 
Rwanda Tribunal has marked a major step forward in international 
jurisprudence in recognizing the applicability of international humanitarian 
 
 285. See LAW AND REALITY, supra note 279, at 37–41; see also Hategekimana, Appeals 
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 21–22. 
 286. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.  International attorneys Alhagi Marong, 
Charles Chernor Jalloh, and David Kinnecome, in contrast with the ICTY, assert that the 
Yugoslav Tribunal should likewise look to evidence pertaining to whether due process 
protections provided for by law are in fact violated. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 182, 
185. 
 288. See, e.g., George, supra note 40, at 70; Harhoff, supra note 5, at 584–85. 
 289. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 3–4 (describing the Western requirements for 
transferring ICTY cases to national jurisdictions, which are the same for the ICTR). 
 290. See Harhoff, supra note 5, at 584.  Several State delegates (such as the U.K, Czech 
Republic, and Argentina) at the Security Council meeting considering Resolution 955 shared 
this view. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 6–8. 
 291. See, e.g., GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 110. See generally Morris, supra 
note 96. 
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law to mass atrocities occurring within the confines of a national border.292  
Aside from enabling international law to pierce the veil of domestic 
sovereignty, the Tribunal and ICTY decisions have led to the 
criminalization of specific acts—such as rape as a form of genocide and 
media incitement to genocide—under international law that had previously 
been beyond its scope.293  Preferring the ICTR’s right to hear cases over 
that of Rwanda enhances the authority and scope of international law in the 
present and the future.294 
Another reason Protectionists support the ICTR’s jurisdictional primacy 
speaks to the enormity of the crime committed and the shared responsibility 
of all humanity to respond to the atrocity.  They stress both the international 
nature of the crimes committed and the corresponding duty the international 
community bears in administering justice.295  Since the crimes committed 
were crimes against humanity, then it is the international community’s 
responsibility—not the responsibility of Rwanda or any other nation—to try 
the perpetrators.296  Further, as the ICTR was created to deal with “a threat 
to international peace and security,”297 an international tribunal is the 
appropriate mechanism for dealing with related crimes.298  Therefore, 
opponents of transfer assert, international crimes should be tried at the 
international level not only to buttress the international system but to hold 
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity accountable to all of 
humankind.299 
Finally, maintaining the possibility of transferring cases from the ICTR 
to Rwanda, as long as strict 11bis requirements are met, incentivizes 
Rwanda (and other interested domestic regimes) to reform its legal system 
 
 292. See Magnarella, supra note 28, at 431 (noting that “the ICTR represents an 
important extension of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts”); 955 Meeting, 
supra note 37, at 6–7 (Czech Republic’s delegate noting that “[t]he independent Commission 
of Experts concluded that even though the conflict in Rwanda was a domestic one its 
consequences affected the entire international community, inasmuch as fundamental 
principles of international humanitarian law were violated”). 
 293. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 103. 
 294. Cf. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 7 (Czech Republic’s delegate describing how the 
formation of the tribunal signifies a breakthrough in the codification process of international 
law).  While most writings asserting the importance of the ICTR in establishing international 
law relate directly to the debate over the Tribunal’s primacy, it logically applies to the 
transfer debate as well. 
 295. See Brown, supra note 5, at 395 (“[E]xtraordinary jurisdictional priority is justified 
by the compelling international humanitarian interests involved . . . .”). 
 296. See generally id.  Several State delegates (Russia, Spain, and Nigeria) to the Security 
Council meeting considering Resolution 955 shared this view. See 955 Meeting, supra note 
37, at 2, 11–13. 
 297. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, at 1601. 
 298. See id.; see also Brown supra note 5, at 395 (“[E]xtraordinary jurisdictional priority 
is justified . . . by the Security Council’s determination that the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia, as well as that in Rwanda, constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.”).  Several State delegates (Russia, France, Pakistan) at the Security Council 
meeting considering Resolution 955 shared this view. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 2–
3, 10. 
 299. See, e.g., Brown supra note 5, at 395. 
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and sufficiently integrate Western due process standards.300  New Zealand’s 
delegate to the Security Council in 1994 said as much when he said that “in 
the domestic courts weight must be given to the Arusha human rights 
commitments” if genocide cases were to be dealt with by the Rwandan 
courts.301  In fact, the policy of refusing to transfer cases from the ICTR to 
Rwanda has in reality had this effect. 
For example, the Rwandan Transfer Law, Death Penalty Abolition Law, 
and amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law were all largely 
implemented in order to increase the possibility that the ICTR would begin 
to transfer cases to Rwanda for prosecution.302  The perceived response of 
the Rwandan legislature regarding judicial reforms is noted both in the 
Tribunal’s Reports to the United Nations and in the Tribunal’s decisions 
itself.  Prior to Rwanda’s adoption of the Death Penalty Abolition Law, the 
ICTR President noted that “[a] welcome development since the previous 
Completion Strategy report is that Rwanda has promulgated a law which, 
among other things, excludes the application of the death penalty to cases 
referred from the ICTR or from States.”303  Six months later, the ICTR 
President responded in his report that, following the recent abolition of the 
death penalty, the Prosecutor filed the first three requests for transfer to 
Rwanda under 11bis.304  These statements suggest that the ICTR President 
and Prosecutor view Rwanda’s judicial reform as a response to the 
Tribunal’s firm transfer requirements. 
Similarly, the Tribunal’s decisions regarding transfer requests reflect the 
expectation that Rwanda will reform its judiciary to comport with 
international standards.305  The recent statement of the Chief Prosecutor of 
the ICTR at the United Nations Security Council reflects the position of 
those who believe that strict requirements for transfer of cases encourages 
necessary judicial reform in Rwanda.306  Notably, the Prosecutor 
acknowledged that “[f]ollowing the Appeals Chamber decisions rejecting 
referral cases to Rwanda for trial under rule 11 bis . . . Rwanda is in the 
process of enacting . . . additional legislation to meet the remaining 
 
 300. See, e.g., BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 3 (“To ‘relocate’ these cases, the domestic 
judicial systems had to be based on democratic foundations and the national courts would 
have to be enabled to accomplish their work with independence and impartiality, and with 
due regard for the principles governing international humanitarian law and the protection of 
human rights.”); Marong et al., supra note 24, at 161 (“[R]eferrals to Rwandan authorities 
will be inappropriate unless the Rwandan government officially addresses problems 
regarding fair trials and the death penalty.”). 
 301. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 5. 
 302. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 303. The President of the ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 38, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/323 (May 
31, 2007) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2007]. 
 304. See ICTR Completion Strategy, Nov. 2007, supra note 174, ¶ 35. 
 305. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 40 
(“The Appeals Chamber acknowledges the steps which Rwanda has recently taken to clarify 
the issue of the applicable penalty for transfer cases.”); Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 
8, ¶ 95 (“The Chamber concludes that the Republic of Rwanda has made notable progress in 
improving its judicial system.”). 
 306. See Security Council Meeting 6134, supra note 10, at 12. 
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concerns of the Appeals Chamber.”307  The Prosecutor also acknowledged 
that Rwanda “has also accomplished much in [legal reform]:  the abolition 
of the death penalty; the incorporation of additional fair trial guarantees in 
law; the upgrading of facilities; and the training of personnel” and stressed 
that such capacity-building efforts should be encouraged.308  It is clear, 
then, that the ICTR, at least to some measure, supports the Protectionists’ 
goal of calling for strict transfer requirements in order to encourage legal 
reform in domestic jurisdictions. 
Professor Burke-White, while supporting the notion that the transfer 
mechanism incentivizes domestic judiciaries to undertake meaningful 
reform, argues that such incentive lies mostly in its ability to act as a 
“carrot” within reach.309  Maintaining strict transfer requirements is only 
beneficial insofar as the domestic courts believe that they will be rewarded 
through the successful transfer of cases to their jurisdiction.310  The desired 
reforms, in the Bosnian context, resulted from the state courts’ receipt of 
transfer cases and the expectation that they live up to international 
standards.311  It is, in his view, the continued influence that the international 
court may exert over the domestic proceedings that effectuates true 
reform.312  This then raises the question of the effectiveness of holding the 
carrot just beyond reach if the goal now is to create reform in practice, since 
the legal reforms have already been put in place. 
As illustrated above, the Protectionists prefer adjudication of 
international criminal law at the international tribunal level for two primary 
reasons.  First, they are concerned with the ability of the transfer country to 
conduct fair and impartial trials and value the due process guarantees that 
the ICTR is able to provide.313  Second, they view the Tribunal as an 
opportunity to bolster both international criminal law and advocate for legal 
reform in transfer countries.314  They do so by acknowledging, in their 
statements and in the Tribunal’s decisions, the progress the Rwandan 
legislature has made in response to their strict transfer requirements while 
continuing to deny referral requests, thus dangling the carrot of transfer just 
beyond Rwanda’s grasp in order to spur reform not just in law but in 
practice.315  The Foundationalists, as this Note refers to those who give 
greater credence to the overarching goals of the ICTR as articulated in the 
Tribunal’s founding documents, present a starkly opposing position. 
 
 307. Id. (referring to recent legislation dealing with witness protection and access to 
testimony). 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Burke-White, supra note 110, at 324. 
 310. See id. 
 311. See id. at 324–25. 
 312. See id. at 347. 
 313. See supra notes 253–86 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 288–93, 300–01 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 300–12 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Foundationalists:  Compelling Countervailing Interests Require 
Transfers to Rwanda316 
Those who advocate trying all crimes relating to the Rwandan Genocide 
in Rwandan domestic courts, those who this Note refers to as 
“Foundationalists,” argue primarily that the paramount interest of justice 
requires that such cases be tried in Rwanda in order to satisfy the needs of 
the Rwandan people.  For them, the focus is on Rwandan courts because 
that is where they perceive that justice can be effectively carried out.317  
While motivated by different judicial theories, this loose collection of 
scholars places prime importance on the unique ability of the national 
judicial process to carry out post-Genocide justice. 318  Among the many 
reasons given for the asserted deserved priority and effectiveness of 
Rwandan justice is that as the country where the crimes occurred and 
against whose people they were committed, Rwanda has the greatest 
interest in seeing justice done.319  Moreover, trying top perpetrators in 
Rwanda would contribute toward national reconciliation and enhance the 
legitimacy and capacity of the Rwandan judiciary.320 
1.  The Founding Principles of the ICTR Point Toward Transfer to Rwanda 
Many critics of the ICTR support trying cases in Rwandan courts because 
they perceive that the victors’ interests, as well as the interests of Rwandan 
society as a whole, are better served through domestic trials, even at the 
expense of defendants’ due process rights.321  In general terms, “[i]f 
national prosecutions are conducted with impartiality” and a close 
approximation of due process, then international courts should defer to the 
domestic process.322  Put another way, the international community must 
 
 316. Many of the arguments articulated in this subsection were first asserted by those who 
opposed the primacy and/or model of the ICTR in comparison with trying cases in Rwanda 
from the start.  It therefore follows that many of the same arguments can be made for 
transferring cases from the Tribunal to the Rwandan courts. 
 317. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1259 (arguing that the geographic and 
psychological disconnect between the ICTR and the Rwandan people undermines any 
restorative effect the Tribunal’s trials may have on Rwandan society); Drumbl, supra note 
27, at 624–26 (describing how, in the Rwandan case, an international tribunal may not be 
able to achieve the retributive, deterrent, protective, and rehabilitative goals of post-genocide 
trials without incorporating the national system); Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 163 
(advocating an implementation of a hybrid Rwandan-international tribunal in Rwanda). 
 318. See Clark, supra note 25, at 772–74 (describing different models of justice and their 
applicability to different situations); Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 149–56 
(describing different models of justice, such as the educative, rehabilitative, deterrent, 
retributive, incapacitative and restorative impact models). 
 319. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 196–97. 
 320. See id. at 186. 
 321. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1284–85; cf. Tully, supra note 30, at 386–87 
(noting that the international community should realize that in the pursuit of justice, 
developing countries such as Rwanda may have to sacrifice some political and civil rights). 
 322. Morris, supra note 96, at 358 (drawing upon lessons of the ICTR to outline when the 
ICC should defer to national jurisdictions); see also Harhoff, supra note 5, at 585 
(advocating a synthesis of one view of the ICTR as an independent, isolated unit and another 
view of the Tribunal as a political body that must defer to certain pressures). 
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keep in mind the multifaceted purpose of the genocide and war crimes 
trials, which includes the larger societal goals of national reconciliation and 
judicial capacity building.323  This view is reflected in Security Council 
Resolution 955, which includes a host of reasons and goals for forming the 
ICTR.324  Paramount among those reasons, for the Foundationalists’ 
purposes, is the statement that “the prosecution of persons responsible . . . 
would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace” and the recognition of “the need for 
international cooperation to strengthen the courts and judicial system of 
Rwanda.”325  The founding principles tend to elevate national reconciliation 
and the rebuilding of the Rwandan judiciary over emphasizing the rights of 
the defendant precisely because the concern in 1994 was to hold the 
perpetrators of mass atrocity accountable and rebuild a severely fractured 
society.326  Keeping in mind the founding principles of the ICTR and the 
conceptions of justice and reconciliation, Rwandan courts must be more 
involved—via transfer of cases or other means—in the ICTR’s adjudication 
process.327 
a.  Justice for Victors, Not Victor’s Justice 
At the core of the position of those who advocate swift transfer to 
Rwanda is the contention that the interests of retributive justice—that is, 
holding accountable those guilty of instigating the genocide—are best 
served, and rest, in Rwanda.  This argument draws heavily on early 
 
 323. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1232 (“[T]he purpose of legal intervention is to 
promote peace in local communities by repairing injury, encouraging atonement, promoting 
rehabilitation, and, eventually, facilitating reintegration.”); Møse, supra note 8, at 678–79.  
Sharing this view, several States’ delegates, among them Russia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Spain, Nigeria, and the United States, stated that the Tribunal’s objective, in addition to 
restoring peace and security, should be to promote national reconciliation. See 955 Meeting, 
supra note 37, at 2, 6, 10, 12, 13, 18.  Nigeria’s delegate specifically noted that the ICTR “is 
designed not to replace, but to complement, the sovereignty of Rwanda,” and that it will 
“enhance the prospects of national reconciliation.” Id. at 13.  This view, however, was not 
unanimous. See id. at 7 (the Czech delegate stating, “[t]he Tribunal might become a vehicle 
of justice, but it is hardly designed as a vehicle of reconciliation”).  Delegates (from the 
United Kingdom, Nigeria, and the United States) at the Security Council meeting also 
underscored the importance of rebuilding Rwanda’s broken judiciary. See id. at 6, 13, 18. 
 324. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 325. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, preambular paras.  Further, Security Council 
Resolutions 1503 and 1534 stress the goal of national reconciliation and the importance of 
judicial capacity building. See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 14, ¶ 1 (“[The Security Council] 
[c]alls on the international community to assist national jurisdictions . . . in improving their 
capacity to prosecute cases transferred from the . . . ICTR . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); S.C. 
Res. 1534, supra note 15, ¶¶ preamble, 9 (“[The Security Council] [c]ommend[s] the 
important work of [the] Tribunal[] in contributing to . . . national reconciliation” and 
“[r]ecalls that the strengthening of competent national judicial systems is crucially important 
to the rule of law . . . and to the implementation of the . . . ICTR Completion 
Strateg[y] . . . .”). 
 326. See Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 142 (“Simply, its objective is to address 
and contribute to the improvement of the human rights situation in Rwanda.  It should be the 
prism through which the many objectives articulated for the ICTR are viewed.”). 
 327. See, e.g., Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 161–66. 
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criticism of the legality of the Tribunal in the first place,328 and rests on the 
fact that Rwandan courts have the greatest claim to cases relating to the 
1994 Genocide under traditional notions of national jurisdiction.329  
Rwanda has both unquestioned personal and territorial jurisdiction over 
cases arising from the 1994 Genocide, as the crimes were committed by 
Rwandans, against Rwandans, on Rwandan soil.330  Read maximally, this 
claim undercuts the basis for the ICTR’s delegated primacy, while at a 
minimum advances a reason for the ICTR to transfer cases to Rwanda’s 
national courts. 
However, ICTR critics assert, the Tribunal does not provide justice for 
the Rwandan victims of the genocide.  Rather, the Tribunal “was reaping 
the wrath of the Rwandans each time it pursued a leader to be 
prosecuted.”331  These critics attribute such resentment toward the Tribunal 
to the disparities in sentencing and treatment between ICTR indictees, who 
by and large are the highest-level perpetrators, and those tried in local 
courts.332  As Professor Madeline Morris points out, the combination of the 
local Rwandan plea system and the Westernized ICTR results in 
perpetuating the culture of impunity, in which those tried for lesser offenses 
in Rwanda receive vastly reduced sentences, while the architects and top 
perpetrators of the genocide, tried at the ICTR, receive better treatment and 
detention conditions.333  This creates a perception where no one is held 
accountable and thus undermines the goals of retributive justice.334  To 
counter this undesirable outcome and promote a sense of justice in Rwanda, 
at least some cases concerning top perpetrators should be transferred to 
Rwandan courts.335  While this view advocates a retributive conception of 
justice—let Rwandans be accountable to Rwandans—the next section 
explores the Foundationalists’ assertion that transferring cases to Rwandan 
courts will in fact facilitate social reconciliation. 
b.  “[T]he prosecution of persons responsible . . . would contribute to the 
process of national reconciliation . . . .”336 
Advocates of transfer to Rwanda also assert that trials in Rwandan courts 
would best achieve Resolution 955’s goal of supporting national 
 
 328. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 9 (Brazil’s delegate expressing concern for the 
manner in which the Tribunal was created and underscoring that “the assertion and exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction are essential attributes of national statehood”); Popoff, supra note 97, 
at 377–78. 
 329. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 187; Brown, supra note 5, at 391–92. 
 331. Morris, supra note 35, at 694. 
 332. See Harhoff, supra note 5, at 584; Morris, supra note 96, at 354–55. 
 333. See Morris, supra note 35, at 693–94; Morris, supra note 96, at 354–55.  The local 
plea system, enacted in large part to reduce prison overcrowding and promote reconciliation, 
operates to reduce (or in some cases nullify) sentences in return for full confessions. See 
Morris, supra note 27, at 358–61; Raper, supra note 7, at 32–33. 
 334. See Morris, supra note 27, at 364 (describing the perception of the plea system as “a 
program of impunity”). 
 335. See id.; Morris, supra note 96, at 357 (applying lessons of the ICTR to the ICC). 
 336. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, preambular para. 
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reconciliation.  Proponents of using Rwandan courts to adjudicate genocide 
crimes stress the rehabilitative nature of both airing grievances and bringing 
those accountable to justice,337 and emphasize the role the Tribunal should 
have in promoting human rights within Rwanda.338  Reconciliation is a 
complex process that aims to rebuild fractured relationships between 
antagonists and involves more than punishing the perpetrators (and in some 
cases, no punishment).339  Such a process can only be achieved when a 
certain confluence of factors are met, which allows for the public’s 
widespread knowledge and internalization of the proceedings and results.340 
According to Professors Mark A. Drumbl and Erika R. George, trials are 
only effective for the sake of reconciliation if the public is aware of the 
details of the proceedings and its outcome, and if the defendant recognizes 
his/her wrong as such.341  This is a particularly acute problem when dealing 
with mass crimes of “radical evil,” where, at the time the crimes were 
committed, the perpetrator did not view the crimes as deviant but rather as 
normal behavior.342  In order for the aggrieved society to come to terms 
with the past and move forward, trials must be highly transparent and 
public.343  This enables the public to hear a truthful accounting of the 
atrocities, become satisfied that perpetrators are being held accountable, and 
force the perpetrators to face their victims, thus eroding the perception of 
impunity.344 
While the renowned post-Apartheid South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Committees were concerned chiefly with establishing an 
accounting in order to facilitate healing,345 the Rwandan context requires 
emphasis on disseminating the knowledge that the perpetrators are being 
punished and ensuring that the perpetrators internalize the wrongs they have 
committed.346  Professor Drumbl describes the Rwandan context as a 
“dualist postgenocidal” society in which the victims and perpetrators 
continue to live side-by-side and where, prior to and during the genocide, 
participation in the atrocities was not viewed as morally abhorrent.347  Wide 
dissemination of the trials and perpetrators’ internalization of shame for 
their crimes is necessary in order to signal that genocide ideology and 
ethnic hatred is no longer endorsed by the Rwandan people.348  In these 
cases, trials are most effective when they are located near the populace, 
when they are conducted in a language accessible to all, when the 
 
 337. See generally Clark, supra note 25; Drumbl, supra note 1. 
 338. See Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 142. 
 339. See Clark, supra note 7, at 770; Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 155–56. 
 340. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1253–63. 
 341. See id.; George, supra note 40, at 71. 
 342. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1253–55. 
 343. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1259; George, supra note 40, at 71. 
 344. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1232; Drumbl, supra note 27, at 567–68. 
 345. See George, supra note 40, at 68; see also Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1253–63 
(distinguishing the South African approach from the Rwandan context). 
 346. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1256–63. 
 347. See id. at 1241–52. 
 348. See id. at 1232, 1253–63. 
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proceedings are disseminated through the mass media, and where 
reasonably efficient results may be reached.349 
While the ICTR recognizes the importance of publicizing the 
proceedings,350 critics do not view the Tribunal’s efforts in this matter as 
sufficient to cure the public’s exclusion from the process.351  Particularly, 
the ICTR’s emphasis on using technology to broadcast Tribunal 
proceedings overlooks the fact that the majority of the population lives 
without electricity and is unaware of any of the Tribunal’s activities.352 
Some Foundationalists, such as Professor Drumbl, recognize that fair 
trials are necessary in order to achieve the desired reconciliatory effect.353  
Therefore, they do not advocate trials without due process protections.  
Rather, they argue, given both the importance of national reconciliation and 
the reality that Rwanda is a developing country recovering from societal 
destruction, it is unrealistic to expect and require every due process 
protection before transferring cases to Rwanda.354  In their view, it is 
sufficient that Rwandan courts provide a basic framework for defendants’ 
rights.355  Similarly, Foundationalists also recognize that the Rwandan 
judiciary continues to require assistance in its reform and rebuilding efforts.  
The next section details how they believe the transfer process may serve to 
assist in the reconstruction process. 
c.  “[T]he need for international cooperation to strengthen the courts and 
judicial system of Rwanda”356 Supports Transfer 
Advocates of transferring cases to Rwanda also stress that if the ICTR 
were to transfer cases to Rwanda and work closely with the domestic 
 
 349. See id. at 1259–60; George, supra note 40, at 71 (“[T]he fact that the ICTR was 
geographically and psychologically distant from those most affected . . . undercut the ICTR’s 
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 350. See, e.g., ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16 ¶¶ 61–62 (describing 
the establishment of ten information centers throughout Rwanda, genocide education 
programs, and radio broadcasts of the proceedings). 
 351. See George, supra note 40, at 71; Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 155. 
 352. See Higonnet, supra note 4, at 419–22. 
 353. See Drumbl, supra note 27, at 628 (noting that the right to a full answer and defense 
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 356. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, at 1601. 
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courts, rather than operate as a completely separate institution, the Tribunal 
will be more likely to fulfill its mandate of strengthening the Rwandan 
judiciary.357  One of the primary reasons Rwanda requested that the 
Security Council convene an international tribunal was that the Rwandan 
judiciary was completely destroyed in 1994.358  In so doing, the nascent 
Rwandan government was hoping to create a hybrid system in which 
international and Rwandan judges would work in tandem.359  While that 
was not the outcome, transferring cases to Rwanda and maintaining a close 
working relationship between the domestic courts and the Tribunal can, 
with the support of the international community, work toward strengthening 
Rwanda’s justice sector.360 
As discussed in Part I.B.3.a., the monitoring and revocation mechanism 
not only allows the Tribunal to continue to influence the proceedings but 
may incentivize the domestic judiciary to comport with international 
standards, in effect training them to perform according to such principles.361  
While the recent ICTR Completion Strategies have placed a renewed focus 
on strengthening the Rwandan judiciary,362 critics maintain that the 
Tribunal’s recent efforts do little to overcome years of neglect.363  The 
ICTR Prosecutor has recently acknowledged the necessity of continuing to 
strengthen the Rwandan judiciary in order to better handle transfer cases 
and its own domestic caseload.364  Similarly, Security Council Member 
States link capacity building to transfer cases, stressing that the ICTR must 
strengthen the administration of justice in national jurisdictions with the 
express purpose of transferring cases.365 
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However, some, as stated above, advocate transfer in order to build 
Rwandan judicial capacity; rather than initiating new training programs, the 
ICTR should transfer cases to Rwanda, accompanied by monitors to ensure 
that the judiciary adheres to international standards.366  The ICTR 
Prosecutor, when requesting transfer under Rule 11bis, has repeatedly 
requested monitors with the transfer to ensure that the judiciary fulfills its 
function adequately.367  The Prosecutor has stressed that, according to the 
ICTR Statute, the proposed monitors, as independent observers, would 
“have access to court proceedings, documents and records relating to . . . 
case[s], as well as access to all places of detention.”368  In fact, the 
Prosecutor has refrained from compelling the transfer of four RPF members 
from Rwanda to the ICTR for trial, on the basis that that the ICTR monitors 
confirmed that the Rwandan courts observed fair trial standards.369  Given 
the ICTR Prosecutor’s own admissions, the monitors accompanying the 
transferred cases would have the ability to be involved in all stages of the 
proceedings and would ensure a fair trial in Rwanda. 
This section so far has addressed the Foundationalists’ assertions that 
transfer will serve judicial objectives—that is, it will facilitate justice for 
the Rwandan people, contribute toward national reconciliation, and 
strengthen the Rwandan judiciary.  The next section discusses a deeper 
underlying criticism of requiring certain standards to be met before 
permitting transfer.  Here, they argue that imposing such conditions adopts 
an imperialist attitude by assuming the superiority of Western, largely 
Anglo-American legal systems over any other tradition of jurisprudence. 
2.  Requiring Transfer Countries To Meet Western Legal Standards 
Approaches Legal Imperialism 
A serious ideological critique of requiring transfer countries to meet 
certain legal standards, as represented by the 11bis requirements, is that 
imposing such legal norms on non-Western countries is a form of neo-
imperialism.370  Conceptions of fair trial, comprised of specific due process 
provisions such as the right to legal counsel or the guilty plea, are Western 
legal constructs foreign to many countries, including Rwanda.371  Professor 
Michael Bohlander points out that some of the required procedures are in 
fact unique to the Anglo-American common law tradition and even foreign 
to Continental civil law systems.372  Critics accuse the international 
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community of adopting due process provisions wholesale and applying 
them to non-Western countries, regardless of the cultures, legal norms, and 
traditions of the transfer country.373  Even when domestic systems have 
adopted Western procedure, the ICTR’s lack of consideration for and 
misunderstanding of domestic procedure and legal norms has on occasion 
led the ICTR to misinterpret Rwandan domestic law, particularly when 
evaluating transfer cases.374  For example, in Hategekimana, decided on 
December 4, 2008, the Appeals Chamber refused to look beyond what the 
litigants presented, holding that it lacked the information to determine 
whether the amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law entered into 
force and that therefore, the Law was still ambiguous, even though in 
actuality the amendment entered into force on December 1, 2008.375  This 
perceived ignorance of domestic law, the argument goes, in effect runs the 
risk of “undermin[ing] the local population’s trust in the idea of the rule of 
law as propagated by the international community.”376 
In this view, then, it is unrealistic and patronizing to require the transfer 
country to meet the 11bis transfer requirements in order to qualify as a 
transfer state.  The advocated solution to this perceived colonization of the 
legal systems of these former colonies377 is to discard a strict adherence to 
these requirements and instead recommend transfer so long as certain basic 
provisions are met.378  Others suggest that Rwanda adopt, and the 
international community support, a hybrid system that integrates aspects of 
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both Western judicial systems and traditional judicial methods,379 such as 
those subsequently adopted by East Timor, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone.380  
While the international community has responded to these criticisms in 
forming subsequent international (or, “internationalized”) courts, including 
the ICC, the ICTR has not integrated such criticisms into its evaluation of 
transfer requests. 
While critics of the ICTR’s transfer policy have been primarily 
concerned with according sufficient weight to countervailing judicial 
interests—such as national reconciliation and judicial capacity building—
and international legal imperialism,381 they have not directly addressed the 
Protectionists’ concerns regarding due process protections and the risk of 
victor’s justice.382  Similarly, while Protectionists have devoted much 
energy to advocating defendants’ due process rights and the role the ICTR 
plays in establishing international law and domestic legal reform,383 they 
have seldom addressed Foundationalists’ larger concerns of using 
prosecution to facilitate widespread justice, reconciliation, and judicial 
capacity building in Rwanda.384  Part III of this Note attempts to address the 
deficits in the debate and put forth a workable solution to the ICTR’s 
transfer dilemma, which can serve as a useful paradigm for resolving future 
international and domestic jurisdictional disputes.  Specifically, Part III 
argues that the ICTR, when evaluating transfer requests, should adopt a 
comprehensive balancing approach, wherein it weighs due process concerns 
against the Foundationalists’ countervailing interests in order to make a 
particularized determination on the transfer question.  Part III also argues 
that, in light of the differing tests the ICTR and ICTY use in evaluating 
transfer requests, the Tribunal should adopt a unified approach and place a 
renewed confidence in its monitoring system in order to cure itself of the 
appearances of dealing in double standards. 
III.  ABANDON THE STRICT APPLICATION OF 11BIS WHILE ACCOUNTING 
FOR ADEQUATE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS:  A COMPREHENSIVE 
BALANCING APPROACH 
Part II of this Note analyzed the controversy surrounding the recent ICTR 
decisions not to transfer cases to Rwanda.  Opponents of transfer—the 
Protectionists—argue that the guarantee of due process protections, ensured 
through a strict application of 11bis, is necessary to outweigh the risk of a 
victor’s justice outcome in Rwanda.385  The Protectionists further argue that 
keeping high profile transfer cases in the international system is necessary 
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 380. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra Part II.B. 
 382. See supra Part II.A. 
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in order to create a coherent body of international law, as well as to 
encourage the liberalization of domestic judiciaries.386 
Conversely, advocates of transfer—the Foundationalists—argue that a 
compelling countervailing interest of justice requires that such cases be 
transferred; that the trials of top perpetrators in Rwanda would contribute 
toward achieving justice for the victims of the genocide,387 promote 
reconciliation for Rwandan society,388 and would serve to strengthen the 
domestic judiciary.389  Additionally, they argue that a strict application of 
11bis, and the due process protections guaranteed thereby, implies the 
inherent superiority of Western legal jurisprudence and runs the risk of 
legal imperialism.390 
This part argues that while procedural protections are necessary to 
guarantee the rights of the accused, such an approach runs the risk of 
ignoring the Tribunal’s Security Council mandated mission.  Yet 
denouncing the very primacy of the ICTR and its procedural protections is 
not conducive to remedying the impasse.  Such a position offers no useful 
remedy other than the abolition of the Tribunal as it stands and drastically 
overlooks the importance of defendants’ rights within the judicial process.  
After analyzing these critiques of both positions, this part suggests that the 
question of transfer remains a mixed question of law and fact for the 
Tribunal, one in which it should adopt a comprehensive balancing approach 
wherein the judges consider not only the factors comprising a due process 
analysis under 11bis, but balance such interests against how such a transfer 
will effectuate the Tribunal’s overarching mandate of providing justice, 
restoring peace, promoting reconciliation, and enhancing the Rwandan 
judiciary. 
A.  A Critique of a Strict Application of Due Process Requirements 
This section identifies the deficiencies in maintaining the strict 
application of due process requirements in evaluating transfer requests.  
Specifically, this section asserts that a structuralist reading of the Tribunal’s 
founding documents together with Rule 11bis strongly suggests that the 
Tribunal has thus far read too many compulsory requirements into 11bis at 
the expense of fulfilling its Security Council delegated mandate.  While 
Security Council Resolution 955 lists specific motivating factors for the 
Tribunal’s formation,391 reinforced by Resolutions 1503 and 1534,392 Rule 
11bis contains only the general requirement that the Trial Chamber be 
satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial,393 along with the caveat 
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that the death penalty may not be enforced.394  The specific due process 
protections enumerated in the ICTR Statute only enter the 11bis analysis 
through the judicial interpretation that the rights set out in Article 20 of the 
ICTR Statute comprise 11bis fair trial standards.395  Thus, it follows that the 
Security Council placed the aforementioned objectives of the Tribunal over 
the specific procedural mechanisms through which they were to be 
achieved.396 
Security Council Resolutions 955, 1503, and 1534 strongly suggest that 
the purpose of the ICTR includes, inter alia, using the prosecutions to 
facilitate national reconciliation, restore peace, and strengthen the Rwandan 
courts and that these considerations are to be preserved in the transfer 
process.397  These same goals are listed in Resolutions 1503 and 1534,398 
which were passed for the express purpose of formulating a completion 
strategy for the ICTR.399  The resolutions explicitly provide that such a 
completion strategy, with those purposes in mind, include the transfer of 
cases to national jurisdictions, including Rwanda.400  These three Security 
Council resolutions, when read together, strongly suggest the Council’s 
interest in using the ICTR to contribute to national reconciliation and 
judicial capacity building—which is undoubtedly best achieved through 
working within Rwanda401—and includes the use of transfers as part of the 
Tribunal’s completion strategy. 
Conversely, neither Resolution 955 nor the Statute of the ICTR requires 
due process guarantees for the accused if transferred to a national 
jurisdiction.  The Resolution is silent on the matter, while Articles 20 and 
21 of the ICTR Statute guarantee rights of the accused insofar as the case is 
heard by the Tribunal.402  Rule 11bis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure, 
written by the Tribunal pursuant to Article 14 of the Statute,403 provides 
that the Tribunal must find that the transfer country will guarantee a “fair 
trial,”404 but does not explicitly state that all rights of the accused in 
Articles 20 and 21 must be provided for with no exception.  Rather, in the 
first transfer cases ten years later, the judges extended the general fair trial 
provision to encompass all of the rights of the accused listed in Articles 20 
and 21.405  Additionally, Article 14 of the ICTR Statute recognizes that the 
unique circumstances of the Rwandan genocide may require that procedure 
deviate from the prior established norm, as it states that the judges shall 
adopt the rules of the ICTY “with such changes as they deem necessary.”406  
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Therefore, read together with the stated goals of the Tribunal enumerated in 
Security Council Resolutions 955, 1503, and 1534, the language of the 
ICTR Statute and Rule 11bis, on their face, strongly suggest that there is no 
strict textual basis for requiring the transfer state to provide full due process 
protections for the accused at the expense of other countervailing 
interests.407 
Though, as the Protectionists put forth, a benefit of applying a strict due 
process requirement for transfer cases is the effect of encouraging judicial 
reform in the transfer country,408 the Tribunal must be careful not to quell 
Rwanda’s hope that such reform will be rewarded.  While judicial reform is 
certainly important, the international community must be careful to avoid 
the appearances of legal imperialism and cultural superiority.409  Such 
appearances are only exacerbated when the Rwandan judiciary and 
legislature constantly revise the law and improve adjudication to conform to 
the ICTR’s requirements, only for the Tribunal to find additional reasons 
for denying transfer.410  Furthermore, requiring an in-depth analysis into the 
application of the law of the domestic country by the Tribunal’s judges, 
who are not experts in the transfer country’s law, opens up room for error 
and misapplication of the rule.411  This in turn encourages a Tribunal-
Rwanda game of cat-and-mouse, which over time runs the risk of further 
eroding the public’s confidence in the ICTR’s sincerity in working with 
national jurisdictions.412 
In order to maintain the public’s confidence, the Tribunal must ensure 
that it applies the same legal standards for all transfer cases, regardless of 
the proposed transfer location or the timing of the request within the 
judicial proceedings.  Rwanda’s seemingly Sisyphean task is highlighted by 
the ICTR’s and ICTY’s application of a much lesser scrutiny for 
transferring cases within Europe,413 including to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.414  Further, the ICTR itself applies differing standards when 
deciding whether to transfer a case to Rwanda; the Prosecutor has found 
Rwanda offers sufficient judicial safeguards to merit the transfer of fifty-
five non-indicted cases to Rwanda’s national jurisdiction.415  The 
Prosecutor also has enough confidence in the Rwandan judiciary to trust it 
to try four members of the RPF and withhold seeking transfer of those cases 
to the Tribunal.416  Yet the ICTR judges continually find those same 
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safeguards insufficient to allow transfer of indicted cases.417  The 
protections and rights accorded to a defendant should not hinge on the stage 
of her indictment or on the official who determines transfer.418  As a 
developing country’s “respect for the alleged superiority of the rule of 
law . . . will to a very large extent depend on their perception that the same 
rules apply to all,”419 the Tribunal must be wary not to appear to be 
applying one standard to Rwanda and another to the rest of the international 
community, even if the Tribunal has valid reasons for doing so. 
B.  A Warning for the Foundationalists:  Legal Cultural Relativism Can 
Lead to Victor’s Justice and Serious Violations of Non-Derogable Rights 
In their efforts to critique the structure of the ICTR, Foundationalists run 
the risk of falling into the morass and empty rhetoric of cultural relativism 
and discounting the positive effects of requiring a due process analysis in 
evaluating whether to transfer a case to a national jurisdiction.  While the 
ICTR, and ad hoc tribunal systems in general, may ignore domestic legal 
traditions and impose Western legal standards,420 that in itself is not a basis 
to assume due process protections are without merit.  After all, there have 
been instances in the past of Rwandan courts meting out victor’s justice 
without due regard for defendants’ rights or adequate protections for the 
parties involved, despite the existence of law providing for Western due 
process protections.421  Moreover, while the Tribunal should be careful of 
not dealing in double standards422 or adopting previous tribunal models 
wholesale,423 the Tribunal should nevertheless look outside the letter of the 
domestic law and conduct a factual analysis to determine whether 
protections are met in actuality.424  Conducting a thorough legal analysis of 
whether domestic law meets ICTR requirements without a concern for 
whether the law is applied as such is a waste of resources and makes the 
Tribunal a mockery of its own processes.  Therefore, despite concerns of 
legal imperialism, the Tribunal should continue to conduct a due process 
analysis as a mixed question of law and fact.425 
Additionally, one should not discount the positive effect that a strict 
application of an enhanced 11bis has had on Rwandan domestic law.  Not 
only has Rwanda reformed its legal code to conform with ICTR 
requirements,426 the Rwandan legislature has, ceteris paribus, at times 
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exceeded the ICTR’s requirements for transferring cases.  For example, 
while the 2007 Transfer Law guarantees that the death penalty will not be 
imposed for transfer cases427—thus meeting the 11bis prohibition against 
the use of the death penalty428—the subsequent Death Penalty Abolition 
Law completely abolished the death penalty for any crime.429  While such 
liberalization and reformation of the Rwandan judiciary is not judicial 
capacity building as envisioned by the Security Council resolutions per 
se,430 such progressive reforms should nevertheless be encouraged as part 
of Rwanda’s civic, political, and social restoration. 
Similarly, one should not ignore the role that the ICTR (and other ad hoc 
tribunals) plays in creating a body of coherent international law and its 
positive effects in establishing precedent in trying international crimes 
against humanity.431  While establishing international legal precedents is 
not the paramount purpose of the ICTR, and should not be preferred to the 
pursuit of overall justice, it nevertheless may be a benefit worth 
pursuing.432  It behooves Foundationalists to recognize that a policy that at 
times results in withholding from national courts may nonetheless produce 
beneficial results. 
Parts III.A and III.B focused on both the Protectionists’ and 
Foundationalists’ failure to offer satisfying solutions to the transfer 
dilemma.  While each position may have valid reasons for asserting either 
the importance of the strict due process requirement or the societal benefits 
of trying cases in the domestic courts, neither suggest an innovative method 
to both ensure the sufficiency of the Rwandan judicial process and offer a 
way to transfer ICTR cases to Rwanda.  The next section suggests a 
modified, particularized approach which the Tribunal should utilize in 
evaluating transfer cases, wherein the judges should consider the arguments 
of both the Protectionists and Foundationalists. 
C.  A Consistently Applied Comprehensive Balancing Approach 
Encapsulates the Protectionists’ Fears and the Foundationalists’ 
Aspirations 
1.  A Comprehensive Balancing Approach 
In order to resolve both the Protectionists’ and Foundationalists’ 
concerns, judges should apply a comprehensive balancing approach to 
evaluate whether to transfer a case from the ICTR to a national jurisdiction.  
Like in many domestic common law jurisdictions, the Tribunal’s judges 
must consider a variety of factors when determining this mixed question of 
law and fact.  To date, the Tribunal has claimed to apply a totality of the 
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circumstances test;433 in reality, this is not the case.  Rather, the Tribunal 
has applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether due 
process requirements have been met under Rule 11bis, considering each 
ICTR Statute Article 20 and 21 due process factor independently.434  
Further, the Tribunal has used such a test to determine whether the facts on 
the ground in their totality comport with specific due process requirements, 
such as access to witnesses.435  This is a much more limited—and 
ineffective—test than the comprehensive balancing approach which this 
Note advocates. 
The Tribunal should widen the scope of its test to consider the 
multiplicity of objectives that the Security Council has mandated.436  The 
ultimate inquiry of the Tribunal should consist of a balancing act between 
the goals of national reconciliation and restoration437 on one end and 
concern for the rights of the defendant, including full due process 
protections,438 on the other.  Each factor to be considered, then, is each 
stated purpose of the ICTR and the specific fair trial concerns.  Of course 
these factors are in reality interrelated—encouraging respect for due process 
protections within Rwanda helps to reinforce legal norms and popular 
conceptions of rule of law within the Rwandan judiciary.439  The Tribunal’s 
inquiry is thus reoriented toward its mandated goals by shifting the focus of 
its analysis from the question of whether the totality of present due process 
factors meets 11bis fair trial requirements to whether the totality of the 
various interests, weighed against the interest of a fair trial, merit 
transferring the case to a national jurisdiction. 
While the judicial application of such a broad test may be difficult to 
effectuate, it need not be impossible.  The Tribunal already conducts a 
limited totality of the circumstances test with respect to due process 
requirements, in which it considers a multiplicity of factors together.440  
Here, the judicial challenge is teasing out a workable set of sub-factors to 
evaluate the overarching countervailing interests of retributive justice, 
national reconciliation, and judicial capacity building.441  The Tribunal may 
look at the substance of the case—in particular, the gravity of the crime 
committed or the number of people the defendant is alleged to have harmed 
(directly or indirectly)—in order to gauge what impact a trial in the 
domestic courts may have on national reconciliation.442  If the case involves 
a question of law new to the Rwandan courts, or the sheer scale of the case 
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would involve additional Rwandan legal practitioners, perhaps the interests 
of judicial capacity building would become salient.443  Whatever the factors 
the Tribunal would consider, the goal is not to delineate a clear answer but 
to reintroduce such concerns into the judicial equation. 
In so doing, the Tribunal would recognize the many valid concerns on 
both sides.  It would preserve the Protectionists’ concern for due process 
rights444 by leaving room to rule that a singular omission—such as the lack 
of adequate witness protection—is enough to outweigh countervailing 
judicial interests.  Similarly, it reinforces the importance of due process and 
adequate defense in the criminal trial process, which plays toward the 
Protectionists’ interest in establishing international legal norms and 
precedent.445  It also alleviates some of the Foundationalists’ concern for 
protecting the domestic national interest in the proceedings446 by 
reintroducing the consideration of national reconciliation and restoration 
into the judicial equation.  Also, by addressing Rwandan national concerns 
in their opinions, judges may be able to dispel the sentiment that the 
Tribunal is not concerned with Rwandan justice447 and deals in legal 
imperialism.448  Such expression of judicial goodwill may prevent debacles 
like the Barayagwiza decision in the future, or at minimum quell the uproar 
that such an opinion can generate.449  Also, now that the ambiguity over 
Rwanda’s penalty structure is most likely resolved,450 this approach also 
opens up the possibility that the absence of one factor—complete witness 
protection451—is by itself insufficient to outweigh the other due process 
protections and countervailing interests together, thus allowing the Tribunal 
to permit transfer to Rwanda.452 
2.  Uniform Application for All Transfer Cases 
The standards the Tribunal uses to evaluate transfer cases, regardless of 
the requested transfer country, must be consistent in order to avoid 
appearances of legal imperialism and dealing in double standards.  The 
ICTY Appeals Chamber’s rulings that the court need not consider the actual 
application of Bosnia’s law regarding witness protection,453 together with 
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the ICTR’s similar rulings regarding the transfer of cases to Europe,454 does 
not comport well with the ICTR’s willingness to look beyond Rwandan law 
and in fact rule against transfer based on the factual, and not legal, 
findings.455  If the Tribunals are sincere in their efforts to establish 
international legal norms, such consistency is of paramount importance. 
Likewise, the treatment of the 11bis monitoring mechanism should be 
accorded the same weight between the ICTY and ICTR, and within the 
ICTR, between the Prosecutor and the judges.  Both the ICTY and the 
ICTR Prosecutor have considered the monitoring mechanism sufficient to 
remedy deficiencies in the domestic judicial proceedings.456  It is 
particularly glaring that the ICTR Prosecutor has deemed such safeguards 
as sufficient457 while the Tribunal has held otherwise.458  This Note 
advocates that the ICTR accord greater support and weight toward the use 
of monitors to ensure fair trials in transfer countries, in line with the 
positions of the Prosecutor and the ICTY.  This may be greatly facilitated 
by the Tribunal’s recognition of an official monitoring body, or the use of a 
body that the Tribunal has already approved, such as the African 
Commission.459  Further, if, after transfer, monitors cannot guarantee a fair 
trial, the Tribunal may still order the case remanded to Arusha460 and 
Rwanda must comply.461  Not only can these mechanisms cure deficiencies 
in the domestic proceedings if they arise, the domestic judges’ knowledge 
that a case may be compelled back to the Tribunal once transferred to 
Rwanda may incentivize them to comport with international standards.462  
At any rate, the Rule 11bis(D)(iv) monitoring mechanism should be used to 
its maximum potential in facilitating the transfer of cases to national 
jurisdictions, in particular Rwanda, where the Prosecutor has already 
deemed such mechanism successful. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of whether to transfer cases from an international tribunal to 
a domestic court of a post-conflict country in which the crimes originated 
necessitates the consideration of many competing interests.  Concerns over 
due process protections for the accused and the risk of victor’s justice must 
be balanced against the broader goals of national reconciliation, restoration, 
and justice for the victims.  The repeated refusal of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to transfer cases to Rwandan courts offers a 
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perfect microcosm for analysis of this issue.  To date, the Tribunal has 
weighed heavily in favor of ensuring all due process protections in the 
transfer state, to the exclusion of considering the other founding principles 
of the ICTR.  However, the Tribunal should instead adopt a comprehensive 
balancing approach in which it weighs all pressing judicial interests 
together in making its evaluation.  This, together with a renewed confidence 
in monitoring mechanisms, may alter how the Tribunal and other 
international institutions approach this issue. 
This is a crucial time for the ICTR to reevaluate its standards for transfer.  
As the Tribunal has just once again pushed back its completion strategy 
deadline, the transfer of cases to Rwanda becomes even more important.  
Since Rwanda has removed all ambiguity from its laws pertaining to the 
applicable punishment in transfer cases, the only remaining obstacle is 
adequate witness protection.  Utilizing a multifaceted balancing approach 
combined with a renewed confidence in trial monitoring, the Tribunal may 
be able to reconsider its position regarding transferring cases to Rwanda.  
More generally, although the era of the ad hoc system is drawing to a close, 
other international courts will most likely continue to supplement and 
operate in tandem with the ICC.  Questions of how to deal with competing 
national and international jurisdictional claims are unlikely to disappear 
from the international legal discourse. 
 
